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Summary  findings
Foreign direct investment brings host countries capital,  increase foreign direct investment but do reduce fiscal
productive facilities, and technology transfers as well as  revenues), and many restrictions on foreign direct
employment, new job skills, and management expertise.  investment.
It is important  to the Russian Federation, where  They recommend that Russia switch to a modern
incentives for competition are limited and incentives to  approach to foreign direct investment by:
becoming efficient are blunted by interregional barriers  Amending the newly enacted foreign direct
to trade, weak creditor rights, and administrative barriers  investment law so that it will grant nondiscrirninatory
to new entrants.  "national treatment"  to foreign investors for both right
Bergsman, Broadman, and Drebentsov argue that the  of establishment and post-establishment operations,
old policy paradigm of foreign direct investment  abolish conditions (such as local content restrictions)
(established before World War II and prevalent in the  inconsistent with the World Trade Organization
1950s and  1960s) still governs Russia. In this paradigm  agreement on trade-related investment measures
there are only two reasons for foreign direct investment:  (TRIMs), and make investor-state dispute resolution
access to inputs for production  and access to markets for  mechanisms more efficient (giving foreign in'vestors the
outputs. Such kinds of foreign direct investment,  chance to seek neutral binding international arbitration,
although beneficial, are often based on generating  for example).
exports that exploit cheap labor or natural resources or  * Strengthening enforcement of property rights.
are aimed at penetrating protected  local markets, not  e  Simplifying registration procedures for foreign
necessarily at world standards for price and quality.  investors, to make them transparent  and rules-based.
They contend that Russia should phase out high tariffs  Extending guarantee schemes covering basic
and nontariff protection for the domestic market, most  noncommercial risks.
tax preferences for foreign investors (which don't
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As the much-discuissed  "global  market" has become  a reality  over the last ten years, all countries
find it more difficult  to stay competitive  without  FDI. Noteworthy,  the most competitive  economy  in the
world,  the United  States,  is not only the largest single  source of, but also the largest single  destination  for
FDI. The countries  of the European  Union are also among  the largest sources and destinations  of FDI.
Among  the developing  colntries, and among  the transition countries  of both Europe  and Asia, the fastest
growing ones are the biggest recipients of FDI.  The empi  rical evidence suggests that for emerging
economies, a one percentage  point increase in FDI (measured  as a proportion  of GDP) leads, ceteris
paribus, to an extra 0.8 percentage  point increase  in per-capita  income. 1 Of course, part of the cause-and-
effect is that growth  attracts  FDI. But there are important  causation  forces from FDI to competitiveness  -
-FDI brings at least four things of value: financial  capital, mamagement  skills, technology,  and access  to
export markets -- and  therefore sustains growth as well.
Russia can and should take full advantage  of benefits associated  with inflows of FDI. Given the
country's large endowment  of natural resources  and educated  labor force, as well as its potentially large
market, this might;  seem as a not too difficult  task.  Yet the record is discouraging. In spite of explicit
efforts by government  to hIre investors,  Russia has received  far less FDI than it could,  both relative  to its
economy's size and in comparison  with other emerging rrarkets. From 1992-1999,  cumulative FDI
inflows to Russia total about US$16 billion.  This level of FDI is very low in light of Russia's vast
attractive  resources-both. natural and human-and  her great economic  potential.  It is also very low
relative to other transition countries in the region, adjusted for population size: on a per capita basis,
cumulative  FDI in Russia is US$15,  compared  to US$84 for Poland,,  US$118 for the Czech  Republic  and
US$221  for Hungary. This result implies,  in part, a flawed  policy  strategy  regarding  FDI.
This paper analyzes Russia's policy regime governing  FD][  and suggests  policies to bring it in
line with international  practice. We begin with a discussion  of how the emergence  of globalization  has
affected  the nature of FDI, both from the standpoint  of investors  and host countries. We then turn to a
review of the provisions  related to FDI embodied in the WrO, to, which Russia is seeking accession.
This is followed  by ani  analysis of the current FDI policy f^amework  in Russia.  We then present an
overview  of best international  FDI practices. The paper concludes  with recommendations  for improving
Russia's FDI policy regime-stemming both from the necessily  to attract cutting edge  FDI and to comply
with WTO  norms.
Globalization  and Implications  for Competition  for FDI
In many transition  economies,  there is poor comprehension  of important  changes  in a world-wide
pattern of FDI over the last two to three decades. The key word ifor  these changes is globalization  of
FDI.
*  This  paper  updates  and  draws  on  Bergsman,  Broadman  and  Drebentsov  (1  999).
1  See  JPMorgan  (1998)."Globalization"  is  a  widely  used  expression,  which  covers  three  main  mutually  reinforcing
processes:
*  Country policies: More and more countries have continued to liberalize their economic policies over
the last decade or two, becoming more open both to  trade flows (lower tariffs,  fewer  quantitative
restrictions, currency convertibility)  and to FDI flows (fewer restrictions on which  sectors are open
or percentage of foreign ownership allowed, abandonment of case-by-case approval procedures, etc.).
The ones that are not open are experiencing difficulties in maintaining growth.
*  Company behavior:  More  and  more multinational  corporations  (MNCs)  are  adopting  integrated
regional or even global strategies, using both subsidiaries and strategic allies to locate interdependent
facilities in various countries so as to maximize their competitive edge worldwide.  This is a change
from the dominant behavior of 10 or 20 years ago, when MNC subsidiaries in foreign countries were
operated more or less independently of each other and were located anywhere there was a market and
without regard to whether the locale offered the conditions necessary for world-competitive price and
quality production.
*  Technology:  Huge  improvements  in  international  transportation  and  communications,  combined
with greater  use of electronic  controls  and  information  storage  and  transmission,  have  made  the
opening of countries, and the change in behavior  of companies, viable  and  important.  Computer-
aided  design  and  manufacturing  ("CAD-CAM")  make  it possible  to  design  a  product,  and  the
software that  will  control  some of  the  machines  that  produce  it  in  one  location  and  have  the
production process changed and running in another  location anywhere  in the world  in a matter of
hours or at most a day or two.  Other  changes in communication technology  have also drastically
reduced many of the costs of locating interdependent activities in more than one location.
The  changes  in  technology,  behavior  and  policies  reinforce  and  validate  each  other.
Globalization is a positive-feedback process.  Because of this, the world  is separating into two kinds of
countries:  those that  offer  competitive  conditions  for  production,  attract  FDI, trade,  and  experience
continuing increases in productivity  and hence  in incomes, and those that  do none of these things  and
stagnate.
In  the  course  of  globalization  it  has  become  apparent  that  international  trade  and  FDI
complement each other.  Of course in some transactions FDI is a substitute for trade; especially  in large
markets a foreign company may decide to locate production  facilities in the market as an alternative to
trying to export from its home country.  But in today's  globalizing world, trade and FDI go together.  In
fact, for many MNCs the edge between trade and  FDI becomes thinner and thinner.  As one business
executive noted at a recent meeting of the OECD Trade Committee: "Firms trade to invest and invest to
trade."  Of all world trade, intra-firm trade among MNCs accounts for about one-third, and MNC exports
to non-affiliates accounts  for another  one-third.  Thus, only the  remaining one-third of world exports
does not directly involve MNCs.2
Within this context, the location of the most efficient, up-to-date, competitive facilities is decided
more by MNCs and  less by arms-length, market forces.  As a result, even very large  countries find it
more difficult to "go  it alone."  In terms of economic development  it has become very costly for any
country,  developing, developed or transitional, to be outside this web of globalized production.
2  For a discussion  of intra-firm  trade,  see Broadman  (1991).
2Tvvo  other aspiects;  of MNC behavior are also results of the above-mentioned  changes in the
world  economy  and forces that validate  and increase  those changes:
*  Inter-company  collaboration:  Spurred  by  the  success  of the  Japanese  keiretsu,  more and  more
companies  are actively  collaborating  with suppliers  in the design of their products and/or processes,
and are taking actions to nurture long-term  relations (e.g. less subject to being switched on-off in
response  to short-term  changes  in demand  or other short-term  forces). Just-in-time  inventory  policy
is only a part of this.  Some elements of these trends have increased the importance  of locating
interacting  facilities near each other, in opposition  to the forces that decrease the costs of distance
described  above.
*  Intense competition, anmong  companies and countries:  The greater openness of national economies
and the growing multiinational consciousness of businesses have! dramatically increased competition
in procluct and factor nnarkets almost everywhere.  Comfortable, "quiet life" production at less than
world-standard  quality and price is a rare luxury for management  and labor as well.  Prospects  for
such production have no appeal for MNCs, and today, investors are very reluctant to locate important
facilities anywhere thal:  offers them second-class conditiorns. What MNCs are looking for is a set of
policies that simultaneously  provide security of markei:  access and nondiscrimination  vis-a-vis
domestic  investors. Parftially  beneficial  policies are not appropriate  anymore;  for to put at stake  state-
of-the-art  investments,  MNCs  need  to  be  sure  in  stability  along  the  whole  trade-investment
continuum. MNCs  do establish facilities in higher-cost or higher risk locations when there are
attractive markets; but they are often not integrated into their international strategies, may not have
their  best  technologies,  and  do  not bring  the  full  poteintial benefits  of  FDI.  Hence  keeping  a
restrictive or even Ea  distorted type of FDI regime prevents an economy from harvesting all benefits
associated with the modern-type inflow of capital.
Having  a  less  favorable  FDI  regime  relative  to  what  other  countries  offer  is  especially
detrimental to  the economy because countries compete for FDI among themselves.  In the  1950s and
1960s, countries competed for export-oriented FDI but did not have to compete for FDI that was oriented
to domestic markets -- just  a large market, with protection  frem imports, was enough.  Thus, a country
such as Russia would not have offered tax holidays, cheap land, or other incentives.
Today, with globaliizing  investment becoming more important, even countries with large markets
have  to  compete.  Privileges  often  offered  to  FDI  seem  as  a  natural  response  to  this  competition.
However, the most effective  instruments of such competition do not include tax concessions  or other
types of foreign investment  preferential  treatment (see  below).  Rather  a reasonable,  transparent  and
stable tax system is necessary  to attract modem  FDI; extremely  low rates or special treatment  is not.
Most of the countries that  are succeeding in attracting this  kind of FDI are  in fact not offering such
special treaLtment  - the  exceptions  are a few Asian  countries that  have been  caught in a bidding  war
amongst themselves.  Russia needs to undertake a comprehensive review  of its FDI policy regime and
substitute  a  stabilily-and-safety  package  for  old-type  privileges  if  it wants  to  attract  today's  foreign
investor.
Russia's harmonization  with the realm of globally  operating  MNCs is discretionary. But Russia
is also acceding to various international economic institutions, of which the World Trade Organization
(WTO) is of key  importance  for shaping national policies towards  FDI.  Russia, as a nation  seeking
accession to the WTO, will have no other option but to harmonize its regime with WTO requirements.  It
is  important  for  the  government  to  have  a  clear  understanding  of  both  those  regimes  and  the
inconsistencies with them that current policy presents.
3International Agreements and Russia's FDI Policy Regime
The  Agreement  on  "Trade-Related  Investment  Measures"  (TRIMs),  entered  into  by  WTO
members during  the Uruguay  Round, has  a  direct  bearing  for  shaping the  FDI  regime  of a  country
seeking WTO  membership.  Acknowledging that certain  measures  towards  investment have apparent
restrictive  or distortive  implications  for  international trade,  the  TRIMs  Agreement  stipulates  that  no
signatories shall apply any TRIM inconsistent with the Article HI and Article XI of the GATT 1994.
Fleshing this out, the Appendix to the TRIMs Agreement lists some types of prohibited TRIMs.
Among such measures, be it a mandatory requirement or a prerequisite for obtaining some privilege, are:
(i)  those that  require  particular  levels  of  local  sourcing  by  an  enterprise  - "local  content
requirements";
(ii)  those that restrict the volume of imports which an enterprise can buy or use to the volume or
value of products this enterprise exports - "trade balancing requirements";
(iii)  those  that  restrict  the  volume  of  imports  to  the  amount  of  foreign  exchange  inflows
attributable to an enterprise - "sufficient foreign exchange earning capacity requirements";
and finally
(iv)  those that restrict exports by an enterprise either in terms of the particular type of products
(or their  volume  or value), or,  generally, in  terms of  a proportion  of local production  -
"supply to local market requirements."
It seems at the moment that the second and the third clusters of potential non-compliance are not
relevant to Russia.  Indeed, there  are no such restrictions  in existence  so  far.  Yet as we  show below,
Russia is a clear case for both the first and the fourth groups of inconsistent TRIMs.  It is particularly so
if one bears in mind that, as the above text indicates, prohibited TRIMs include not only explicit bans or
restrictions, but also any condition of a nature described in one of four clusters above that is necessary to
comply with to obtain an advantage. 3
Another  item that  is critical  with  respect to the  TRIMs  Agreement  pertinent  to Russia  is as
follows: the Agreement requires the mandatory notification of all non-conforming TRIMs covered by the
above list (whether they are implemented at the federal or sub-national level), and calls for elimination of
such TRIMs over a transition period.  The transition period varies according to a country's  status.  Since
Russia has, to  date, notified the  WTO  Secretariat that  it is going to accede  to this  organization  as a
developed country, the transition  period will be just  two years,  in contrast  to the five years granted to
developing  countries.  Similarly,  neither  potential  extension  of the  transition  period  nor  an  allowed
deviation form the provisions of the TRIMs Agreement, that are available to developing countries., could
be utilized by Russia. 4
3The  term "advantage"  is not defined in the TRIMs  Agreement.  However,  it is understood  to cover all forms of
preferential  treatment,  including  tax-based  or interest  rate-based  ones.
4  Unavailability  of the latter temporary  deviation  acceptable  to WTO, if carried out by a developing  cou:try for
balance-of-payments  purposes, seems to be a particular loss for Russia given persistent attempts by the
authorities  to introduce language on trade restrictions  for balance-of-payments  purposes into the national
4Apart  from the WTO, there  was,  until recently, another  proposed  international agreement  on
FDI: the  Multilateral  Agreement  on  Investment  (MAI)  -- the  OECD  countries'  initiative.  Although
negotiations for the MAI have been  suspended, when  and if it comes into existence, the MAI would
replace the current world-wvide  network of bilateral  investment treaties (BITs)5, regional agreements and
OECD-type vehicles (Codes of Liberalization or Declaration and Decisions on International Investment
and Multinational Enterprises).
Russia's FDI Policy Regime: Achievements and Challenges
It should be ac]knowledged  that Russia has been constantly and explicitly trying to attract FDI,
and hence make the FD[ regime more attractive.  However, a relatively small amount of accumulated FDI
suggests that the government has not been very successful.  Of course the lack of political and economic
stability has been  an important stumbling  block and even a first  class policy towards  FDI would not
suffice to overweigh that.  While acknowledging the importance of macro stability, nonetheless, Russia's
FDI regime has significant flaws.
The most serious challenge Russia faces at the moment is to switch from an obsolete approach
towards luring foreign direct  investment to modern  one.  The fornmer,  in the  case  of Russia, involves
relatively high tariff protection of the domestic market, and on top of that, specific privileges offered to
FDI.  The latter approach would require getting rid of both these stic]ks  and carrots, and providing foreign
investors with a generic climate conducive for attracting cutting-edge capital.  We will come back to this
issue.  Let us start with a review of specific problems of the Russian :FDI  policy regime.
TRIMs Inconsistent with  WTO  Rules.  The first and the  smallest cluster of such problems
comprises procedures incoinsistent  with the TRIMs Agreement.  The government has notified the WTO
Working Party of just  a. single prohibited TRIM so far.  Moreover, the govermment  has stated that even
that  TRIM: is  not implemented.  Indeed  in December  1997 the  government  submitted  to  the  WTO
Secretariat an Addendum  "Regime in the  Area of Trade Related hivestment Measures", which  claims
that  while  "[the]  Russian  national  legislation  currently  in  effect: contains  no  general  trade-related
investment measures inconsistent with the requirement of the TRIMs Agreement", the Chapter II of the
Federal Law "On Production Sharing Agreements" (PSA) contains thie  following language:
Grant Russ ian l'egal entities, all other factors  being the same, a preferential  right to participate
in the perjbrmamce of operations  under the [Production  Sharing] Agreement  as  contractors,
suppliers, carries or  otherwise...  The Parties shall  rtipulate in the Agreement  that at least a
certain portion  of the basic equipment for  mineral production and processing..  to be purchased
by the investor with subsequent  cost recovery out of compensatory share  of products  shall  be
manufactw-ed within the Russian Federation.
The government has stated that "for full implementation of this  law, the adoption of additional
normative ]!egal  act.s is required", and that no actual contracts signed so far under an umbrella of the PSA
legislation contain conditions specified in the law.
legislation  and other nornative acts. Accession  to WTO would  make  these attempts  useless  for Russia  will not
be permitted  to use  this excuse.
5 Today,  there are over sixteen  hundred  active  BITs entered  into by various countries.
5At least three additional TRIMs Agreement inconsistent measures have been contemplated by the
Russian  authorities in  1998.  Even in  1997, when  notification was  submitted, the PSA law did affect
actual agreements -- if not yet contracts -- of partners involved in deals covered by the PSA legislation.
Two examples are the Prirazlomnoye and  Sakhalin-l  oil field projects.  In the former  case, the Russian
government  issued  a  decree  explicitly  naming  a  Russian  producer  (Sevmash  company)  the  main
equipment supplier for the project.  In the latter, the  agreement states that at  least seventy percent  of
equipment for the project shall be procured from Russian  producers.  These requirements  constitute a
clear case of the first-type TRIMs prohibited in the Illustrative List annexed to the TRIMs Agreement.
The realm  of PSAs  does not constitute  the  sole example  of WTO-inconsistent  TRIMs.  The
Federal Law "On Privatization of the State Property and on Principles of Privatization of Municipality's
Owned Property in the Russian Federation", approved on July 21, 1997, contains the following TRIMs
Agreement inconsistent language (Article 21.5):
While selling  privatization  objects  at  a  commercial  tender,  there  might  be  established  an
investment condition  in a form  of a winner's  obligation to carry  out prescribed  measures for
tariff  and  non-tarif  protectionism  of  the  Russian  producers,  including procurement  of  the
Russian raw commodities, materials and semi-processed goods...
Moreover,  on  April  23,  1998  the  Government  issued  Resolution  No.  413  "On  Additional
Measures to Attract Investment for the Development of Domestic Automobile Industry", which inter alia
establishes an explicit link between granting an investor the right to import under the "Free  Ware&house
Customs Regime" - an exemption  from paying  import duty  on any  imports  used in  a project  lby an
investor -- and "share of costs incurred on the territory of the Russian Federation."  In view of the earlier
comment that TRIMs Agreement inconsistent measures include not only mandatory ones, but also those
conditions that are prerequisites for obtaining an "advantage", such a "local content"  TRIM constitutes a
clear breach.  Similar infringement of the TRIMs Agreement will be established  by another government
Resolution.  That Resolution creates a direct  link of government's  approval of the national air  carrier
Aeroflot's  purchases  of foreign  made aircraft  to  its purchases of domestically produced  airplanes  (in
proportion of one imported plane per four Russian-made ones).
Another apparent example of TRIMs Agreement inconsistency has been recently created by the
national quasi-state bank, Sberbank, 6 which announced a lending policy in mid-1998.  It started to grant
preferential  interest  rates  on  commercial  loans  to  companies  purchasing  Russian-made  products  (24
percent vis-a-vis 27 percent for purchases  of imported goods), which again falls under the first-type of
prohibited TRIMs. 7
Finally, resolutions falling in the fourth group of prohibited TRIMs are issued from time to time.
The most recent examples were resolutions  establishing an export quota or a temporary export tax on
exports of fuel oil.  It was also reported the Prime Minister ordered oil  companies that did not honor
agreed shipments to domestic agricultural  consumers would be deprived of access to export pipelines.
Such measures are typically considered to be TRIMs Agreenient inconsistent.
6  Sberbank  is formally  a commercial  bank, yet it is predominantly  owned  by the Central  Bank of Russia.
7  In fact, even  if there  were no TRIMs  Agreement,  this measure  would  still  be considered  WTO inconsistent,  for this
is exactly  a type of measures  prohibited  not only by TRIMs Agreement,  but also by an earlier  Agreement  on
Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures.
6General Problemls  of the  FDI Regime.  Although  the above problems  are significant, they
should not pose  a difticult dilemma for the Russian  authorities.  Indeed,  if Russia  is keen on  WTO
accession, the government has eventually no  choice but to fice  the necessity to eliminate  inconsistent
TRIMs.  It  is nol: as  simple with  other peculiarities  of the  Russian  FDI  regime,  where  government
agencies exercise much greater discretion, and hence, might consider changing the current approach only
if convinced that revisions would serve Russia's  interests.  This is a much bigger cluster of problems than
the previously discussed ones.  For simplicity of analysis it is convenient to divide it into two groups: (i)
remaining excessive restrictions on FDI, and (ii) unnecessary privileges granted to FDI.
Restrictions  on FI)L Many countries have restrictions  for FDI in sectors considered  strategic,
either in terms of natioinal  defense or economic stability (financial sector), or vital for preserving national
identity (most commonly, culture and mass media).  Formally, Russlia does not deviate significantly from
this pattern.  The Federal law establishing the set of activities with banned or restricted FDI does not look
completely unreasonable.  In fact, in the first  list attached  to this  law -- which  establishes  activities
prohibited  for foreign investors -- there are only a relatively i ew areas.  The second list attached to this
law -- comprising activities with restrictions for  FDI -- is more problematic.  On top of military-related
or dual technologies, it includes (i) many infrastructure sectors - (a) federal electric energy distribution
systems 8,  (b)  communications, (c) marine  transportation,  (d)  aviation,  (e) railroads,  (f)  civil  airports
construction, (g) highvway  maintenance and surveillance,  etc-as  well  as (ii) production  of maps and
globes,  (iii)  pharmaceuticals,  (iv)  ethyl  alcohol,  (v)  alcoholic  beverages,  (vi)  specialized  investment
funds, (vii) land research and development, (viii) auditing, amnong  imany  other sectors.  It is difficult to
rationalize the need to restrict  foreign investors'  participation  in rmany  of these activities,  particularly
given that many of these sectors desperately need an injection of modern technology or managerial skills
that FDI brings in.
With regard to restrictions in Russia's  financial sector, many countries have restrictions  of this
kind.  Still, the current  ceiling  for foreign capital  in (ix)  banking  -- 12 percent -might  be increased
without  a real threat  to  national banking independence while  contributing  to  enhancing efficiency  of
banking services.  The latter is particularly important at the current stage of market transition in Russia,
where  resumption  of  economic  growth  is  hampered  in  part  by  the  lack  of  efficient  financial
intermediation for  domestic  savings  and  by  the shortage  of affordable  commercial  credit  to  the real
sector.  The  same  is  true  with  respect  to  (x)  insurance,  where  direct  activities  of  foreign  owned
companies are entirely prohibited, and foreign ownership  is limitecl to 49  percent of Russian  insurance
companies' charter capital.
Tlhe  next layer of restrictions is associated with the State Privatization Program (SPP), which is
approved on an annual basis.  The current draft SPP is more liberal towards FDI than its predecessors.  It
reduces  several types of previous  restrictions  and  limitations  -- like discretion  of local  authorities to
allow foreign participation  in privatization  of medium and  small  companies, the  right  of the  Federal
Security Service to recomrnend annulling results of privatizatiDn auctions if it has objections to a foreign
winner, and so on.  This lilberalization  is rooted in the federal law establishing lists of sectors where FDI
is either banned or restricted.
Preferential  Treatment  of  FDI.  Simultaneously  wir.h considering  easing most  of the  above
restrictions,  the government  should eliminate  specific privileges  offered to foreign  investors.  One of
them  is  free  customs  warehouse  imports.  In  addition  to  that,  the  government  grants  import  duty
8  An example  of exercising  this right was the passage  by the Duma of a law establishing  a 25 percent ceiling on
foreign  ownership  of RAG  UES shares.
7exemptions. The most recent example  of the latter is a decree that slashes  by a half all import  duties due
on shipments  of those foreign companies  that will bring over $100 million  in investment  into the country.
There is much cross-country  evidence  that tax concessions  are not only inefficient  mechanisms
for facilitating  FDI, but they are quite  costly to the  fiscal balance-an  obvious  point that cannot  be over-
emphasized  in the Russian  context. In fact, a lot of countries  that in the past have experimented  with this
approach  to attract FDI, including  Indonesia,  Morocco,  Romania,  Latvia and China,  have since started  to
phase out tax preferences  for FDI. 9 The Russian  government,  whose finances-absent high oil prices-
would be under enormous  pressure,  has even more  incentives  to follow that path. The same is relevant  to
Russia's Special  Economic  Zones. Most  of them have never  moved  further  than  just being established  by
a decree.  Yet three that have become operational -- Ingushetia, Nakhodka and Amber ("Jantar",
Kaliningrad)  - arguably  have engendered  more  abuses  and distortions  than advantages.
Indeed,  as early as 1992  the World  Bank's Foreign Investment  Advisory Service  (FIAS)  warned
the Russian  authorities  that "if the special [tax]  treatment  goes only to foreigners,  then there will be... the
formation  of hundreds  and then thousands  of false  joint ventures  or foreign-owned  companies,  in which
local entrepreneurs  find friendly foreigners to lend their names to enterprises and thus reduce tax
liability."'(  Serious foreign direct investment  is not primarily attracted by tax concessions,  nor by the
same token inhibited by reasonable tax rates.  What matters more is consistency, transparency and
predictability  of the tax system. Indeed,  the authorities' own analysis  of foreign investors' complaints
about  Russian  taxation  highlights  the problems  of instability,  inconsistency  and non-transparency."  '
Of much higher priority to foreign investors relative to tax breaks is an ability to present an
appeal on rulings by the tax service without suffering up-front fines and levies, and, in case amicable
resolution  is not possible, the ability  to apply  to an efficient dispute settlement  mechanism. The lack of
independent  and efficient arbitration is one of the main stumbling blocks for FDI in Russia.  This is
particularly  so given  the sheer number  of overlapping  regulations  and numerous  inconsistencies  between
various laws and  other normative acts, such as  Presidential Decrees, Internal Directives of the
government  and ministries, federal and local procedures, etc.  This muddle does not contribute to
building foreign investor's confidence. An example of what this incoherence  causes for the country
occurred in May 1998 when parliamentary  passage of restrictions on foreign ownership of RAC)  UES
contributed  significantly  to turmoil on the Russian  financial  market.
The latter issue raises another important barrier faced by foreign investors in Russia.  This is,  "red
tape" involved in foreign investor activities.  It starts with registration procedures that are openly
considered by investors as one of most cumbersome processes in the world.  Instead of bein,g  a
one stop-low burden exercise, an investor obtaining government approval faces the necessity of
getting clearance by at least 5 to 6 ministries and agencies, which takes from 3 to 6 months".`2
Of course domestic investors have to deal with a lot of red tape, too.  But putting additional
burdens on foreign investors, who by definition face distinct disadvantages in carrying out
business transactions in a different culture than their home turf, seems counter-productive.  :[t;  is
9  For analysis  of the FDI policy  regime  in China  see Broadman  and Sun (1997).
to FIAS  (1992).
11See for example  Foreign  Investment  Advisory  Council  (1994).
12 For details  see Foreign Investment in Russia: Trends and Prospects (1995).
8certainly contrary to the notion of "national treatment."  C'learly,  comprehensive simplification of
business registraltion/licensing  procedures would generally be conducive to development of
Russia's market economy.
International Experience in Reforming FDI Policy Regimes
The old  paradigm  of FDI,  established  before  the Seccind  World War and seen all over the world
during the 1950s  and :1960s,  still characterizes  FDI in the Russian Federation today. In this paradigm,
there are essentially only two motivations for foreign direct investment: access to some inputs for
production, and access to markets for outputs.  The inputs that attracted investment were varied,
including  natural resource deposits, low-cost labor, and lesser ones such as good climates  for tourism.
The attraction  of inputs  continues  to be important  to this day although  the importance  of low-cost  labor is
decreasing. Countries  that were strong in one or both of thes:e  attractions  received  a lot of FDI, even if
their political, legal, or economic  conditions were second-rate. Countries  without large and growing
markets, and without natutral  resources or very cheap labor, were not important destinations for FDI.
Brazil, for exampLe,  received relatively large amounts of FDI during the 1950s and 1960s, almost all
aimed at producing  for the large and protected market, and most of it manifested  in high-cost, low-
productivity  facilities  that would  never  export  and were not iniended  to strengthen  their parent companies
in any significant  way.
These two kincds  of FDI also differed  sharply in their relationship  with trade. Input-seeking  FDI
greatly increased  trade and in fact was dependent  upon it. Market-seeking  FDI was a substitute  for trade
and in many  cases depended  on trade restrictions. Most FDI in those days was "greenfield"  investment  -
that is, it was embodied  in the construction  of new factories.
Global flows of FDI have tripled in the last ten years, while those flows to developing and
transition  countries  have inicreased  by a factor of 10. A signiiicant  part of this explosive  growth has not
been in greenfielcl  activities but rather in mergers and acquisitioDns  (M&A).  Inward M&A in the
developed  countries  - mostly  the European  Union and the US - has been running at 40 to 60 percent of
inward  FDI during  the 1990s,  and in the transition  countries  of Central  and Eastern Europe,  the ratio has
been about 50 percent. The dominant  motivating  force behincl  this M&A activity  has been to rationalize
and strengthen  the competitive  edge  of the investing  company  by giving  it facilities for global  or regional
strategies of creating  interdependent  production,  administration,  research and development,  accounting,
design, and other iparts  of its business. Of course, some additions to physical capacity usually follow
these mergers and acquisitions. But the driving  force is the search for corporate-wide  (i.e. worldwide)
efficiency and competitive  advantage. Sheer large markets do not suffice to attract this kind of FDI.
Hence,  unfortunately,  not rnuch  of it is seen in countries  such ES China  or Russia.
In this newer  paradligm,  almost  all FDI is complementary  to trade. Brazil, which received  US$16
billion in FDI in 1997,  has experienced  increasing  FDI that integrates  it into multinationals'  international
production  strategies. Already  several  years ago, Ford engine;3  were made in Brazil, exported  tQ Canada
where they were assembled  into finished automobiles,  and then sold in the United States. In March of
1998  Ford announced  plans to build two of its new "world  car" models  in Brazil, which will require new
investment  of around US$ I billion before  the end-2000. This is in addition to the $2.5 billion they had
already  planned  to invest in Brazil. Ford  plans to build  on its domestic  sales base to use the country  as its
base for exporting not only to the Mercosur region (neig;hbors  in South America) but also to other
continents. This is the kind of foreign  direct investment  that most strengthens  economies  into which it
goes, and that provides  the best foundation  for continuing  increases  in productivity  and income. The $10
9billion  of FDI that Brazil  received  in one  month in  1998 is  about  equivalent  to the  FDI Russia  has
attracted in the seven years  1991-1997.
Other reforming countries are also attracting this  internationally linked FDI:  Ninety percent of
all television receivers sold in the United  States are made in Mexico, almost all of them by subsidiaries
of multinationals from Japan, Korea and other Asian economies.  Hungary is one of the world leaders in
attracting FDI without natural resources or particularly cheap labor, and this FDI has sparked enormous
growth in exports of high- and medium-tech manufactured goods, especially machinery and equipment,
and machine parts.  Costa Rica has similarly attracted a lot of high-value FDI, including recently an Intel
chip assembly and testing plant; Costa Rica has higher wages than  Mexico  or it neighbors in Central
America, but attracted  Intel with  its rule of  law and  strongly facilitating  investment climate." 3 The
Annex  presents a detailed analysis of the sequence of economic reforms undertaken by Mexico, and the
results in terms of both quantity and kinds of FDI that were attracted.
Conclusion  and Policy Recommendations
There is a short set of characteristics that determine which countries are part of the global web of
FDI and  multinational production.  These elements of attractiveness  have changed  a  bit over the last
couple of decades as globalization has taken hold, but basically derive from first principles of economics.
An up-to-date list would now include the following items:
*  political and economic stability, to provide reasonable predictability for making business decisions;
*  government behavior that facilitates  doing business, rather than harassing it;
*  an FDI legalframework  in line with best international best practice, with security ofproperty  and of
persons and  enforceability of contracts;
*  an  enabling  environment  for  domestic  market  growth,  including  adequately  developed  physical
infrastructure networks and well-trained workers; and
*  the availability of all these conditions to all companies automatically  and by  law, i.e. rules-based,
without a need for special treatment, particular deals, or discretionary decisions by either elected officials
or civil servants.
This last point-a  rules based FDI policy regime-is  key.  It is one of the reasons why Russia's
accession to the WTO is so important.  Indeed, accession to the WTO will certainly be a positive step for
Russia.  It would be both an actual and symbolic step towards Russia's  harmonization with international
economic policy practices and bring it in line with the new paradigm of FDI.  As noted above, it would
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For an analysis  of why Intel chose Costa Rica, see Debora Spar (1998). The conclusion  says, in part:  "What
drew Intel to  Costa Rica, and what was vital  in convincing the  company to  invest, were the basic
characteristics  of Costa Rica's political and economic  system. The country is a democracy,  it is stable, it is
liberal,  and  generally  committed  to economic  openness  and  progress. Its government's  attitude  toward  private
enterprise  is basically  facilitating, rather  than harassing. It also has a  fully transparent  legal system... Note
the other locations of Intel's largest overseas  facilities: Ireland,  Israel, Malaysia  While  clearly  difft  rent in
many  respects  from Costa  Rica, they share a common  pool of political  and economic  assets. They are stable,
democratic,  and  relatively  free of the corruption  and  legalfluctuations  that  plague many of their neighbors..."
10require Russia  to bincd  itself to avoid  many practices  that impede  investment  as well as trade, and to take
other positive steps that will attract high-quality FDI.  The simultaneous or  closely coordinated
formulation  of trade policy  and FDI policy  is an important  step forward  for Russia.
In this respect it is worth noting that in its 1996 World  Investment  Report, the United Nations
Program  on Transnational  Corporations  analyzed  the new paradigm  and concluded:
Yhe decision to locate any part of [a company's operations]  wherever it is best ... means that
FDI and trade  flows are determined  simultaneously. They are both the immediate  consequences
of the same locational  decision...  [This] presents new challenges  for  national  policy makers.
The need'for ,coordinatedpolicy  approaches  acquires  greater importance... National  trade and
FDI policies have typically evolved separately,  frequently influenced by different goals, and
administered  by dlistinct,  often loosely connected  agencies. This ... separation  is not suited to a
world in which  trade and FDI are closely interlinked. (pp.  xxiv-xxvi)
Beyond  the basic conditions  enumerated  above, a good investrnent  climate for a country  such as
the Russian  Federation is made up of many specific elements. There will be a payoff from improving
conditions  for every  kind of business,  and for business  generally.
One of tihe  most damaging  elements  is the tax system, in which instability,  a heavy  burden, and
arbitrary  enforcement  are a major deterrent  to foreign investors. T'he  recently  passed portion of the Tax
Code will help in this regard,  but more needs to be done. Repeated  efforts to amend  or change  the June
1991 law on FDI are:  another source of serious uncertainty for investors.  That law, while it has its
weaknesses,  is not a major impediment  to FDI; the recent amendrnents  to that law, however, are a step
backward.
There  need to be stepped  up efforts in dealing  with crime,  corruption,  lack of security  of property
and persons,  and enforcement  of contracts. This multifaceted  problem,  for foreign investors  and Russian
citizens and companies  alike, is getting worse rather than better. It is a major deterrent to FDI, and
especially  to cutting-edge,  world-class  FDI facilities. Even when  appropriate  legislation  exists, the courts
are unable  to enforce  procedures  and outcomes. It is important  to strengthen  the legal/judicial  framework
to allow  for credible  propprty  rights and adequate  contract  enforcement.
Many countries  have paid increasing attention  to the problem of corruption,  and the debate on
possible'policy  options is on-going. There is no single  solution.' 4 Recent insights  suggest  that corruption
arises when institutions  have monopoly  positions,  there is the ability  to exercise discretion  and incentives
for accountabilit)  are weak. Additional  laws themselves  are unlikely  to bring about significant  reduction
in corruption. Effective  reform  must be directed  to changing  the system:  (i) introduction  of independent
oversight of agencies; (ii) clarifying and making transparent how much official discretion can be
exercised; and (iii) utilizing penalties and rewards for conduct.  Russian authorities should give
consideration  to establishing  independent  anti-corruption  oversight  ("watchdog")  bodies at the federal
and regional levels; models can be found in other countries, such as Hong Kong, Singapore,  Botswana
and Chile. These  two sets of problems  are so severe  that mcst actlions  on other elements  of the business
climate that the Federation  Government  (including  the Durma)  might take will probably not succeed in
attracting much more F]DI,  with the exception of production sharing agreement legislation for the
exploitation  of minerals  and hydrocarbons.
14 See,  for  example,  R. Klitgaard  (1998)  and  C. Gray  and  D.  Kaufniann  (1998).
11Rules-based,  streamlined business  licensing at the Federal  and  local levels needs  to be put in
place.  Measures are needed to address  the problem  that the  setting of license  fees  is subject to the
discretion of local authorities, which results in price discrimination and arbitrary rule.  Reforms here are
a top priority."5  They should be based on other countries'  experiences and on enacting legislation that
sets precise,  streamlined  limits at  all  levels  of government on the  time and  money  required to  get a
business license in most sectors, and codifies  sizeable criminal sanctions  for officials who violate  this
rules-based system.  For certain  sectors, such as human health, the environment and national  security,
more stringent procedures could be applied.
The industrialized countries have large markets, and they also provide the conditions described
above.  That is why they receive over two-thirds of all FDI flows -- in spite of generally high labor costs,
high tax rates, and other factors often said to repel FDI.  Brazil, Mexico, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Poland are examples of other countries, large and small, that are providing the right conditions for
production and trade and thereby attracting efficiency-seeking investments. A few other small countries,
such as Botswana, Costa Rica and Estonia, have created a competitive advantage for themselves where
none existed in nature, by developing business-friendly  laws, regulations,  and administrative practices.
Within  the  Russian  Federation,  regions  such  as  Novgorod,  Nizhny  Novgorod,  Vladimir,  Samara,
Ekaterinburg, Kazan, and Novosibirsk have done the same thing - attracting investors by creating better
business conditions.
The inherent attractiveness of Russia as a place for foreign direct investment means that Russia
does not have to be perfect on every item discussed here.  Moreover, the necessary improvements viould
be just  as beneficial for Russian companies as for foreign-owned ones.  The single most important task is
to create a decent environment to do business honestly and efficiently.
Overall, for Russia to switch to a more modern policy approach to FDI, three core pillars of the
current FDI policy regime will have to be reformed -- (i) eliminating the relatively  extensive non-tariff
protection given to the domestic market, (ii) phasing out existing tax preferences for foreign investors,
and (iii) reducing significantly restrictions on FDI to a limited number of activities.
The following are specific high priority  reforms that  are needed to bring Russia's  FDI policy
regime up to best international practice:
1.  The federal  law "On Foreign Investment"  should be amended to  ensure that  it will (i) grant non-
discriminatory,  "national  treatment"  to  foreign investors  for both right  of establishment and. post-
establishment  operations; (ii) prohibit  the imposition of new and the  phase  out of  existing trade-
related  investment  measures  (TRIMs),  e.g.,  local  content  measures,  export  perforniance
requirements;  restrictions  on  use  of  foreign  exchange;  trade  balance  measures,  including  those
prohibited by the WTO, among others, on foreign direct investment; (iii) provide freedom to foreign
direct investment projects regarding all investment-related transfers, e.g., profits, royalties, the right
of  compensation  for  confiscation,  requisition,  and  other  guarantees;  (iv)  provide  for  binding
international arbitration for investor-State disputes; and'-(v) abide by international law standards for
expropriation,  i.e., expropriation only for a public purpose and with prompt, adequate and'effective
compensation.
15 The general problem of the lack of a competitive  business environment  in Russia is analyzed in Broadman
(2000).
122.  Legislation  should be enacted  to substantially  reduce over a phased period in a time-bound  program
both (i) the number  of sectors  where FDI is presently  prohibited  and (ii) the number  and incidence  of
existing limitations  on FDI in sectors where it is perm:itted  but restricted. Such measures should
cover not only manuiFacturing  sectors but also the infrastructure  monopolies sectors and services
sectors.
3.  The Government should refrain from creating - and not  supporting legislative initiatives for
establishing  - new preferential  measures,  including  policies in the areas of taxation, customs duties,
among other instruments,  for FDI, including the creation uneler  law of new "priority" sectors or
projects. At the same time, the Government  should take all necessary actions, including seeking
enactrnent  of legislation where necessary, to ensure that all existing preferential instruments for
current  FDI projects are not renewed  and thus terminate  concurrently  with existing  contracts.
4. Enforcement  of property  rights should  be strengthened.
5. Foreign investor  registration  procedures  should  be simplified,  rules-based,  and made transparent.
6. Guarantee  schemes  covering  basic  non-commercial  risks should  be maintained  and extended.
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LIBERALIZATION AND  THE ATTRACTION OF
"GLOBALIZING" FDI: TBIE  CASE OF MEXICO
A New Kind of Foreign Direct  Investment. The last 10 or 15 years has seen the rise of a new
kind of foreign direct investment  (FDI). The two older, still-extant paradigms are (a) market-seeking,
and (b) resource-  or cost-reduction  seeking. The new, third kind can be called (c) "globalizing,"  and has
the following  characteristics:
*  Especially  within the manufacturing  sector, most of it is not focused only on either local resources
(i.e. cheap labor,  climate,  raw materials)  or domestic  markets,  but rather is looking  for a combination
of both market access and cost-effective  production. Much of it has significant  shares of its sales
both in export  markets  and in the market  of the host country.
*  A fair amount  of it has been implemented  in transactions  in which mergers  and acquisitions  (M&A),
including  privatizations,  played a major role -- rather than greenfield  activity. This characteristic  is
especially  marked  in FDI among  the developed  countries and may be less common  in the LDCs. Of
course  most M&A  deals are followed  by some greenfield;  the distinction  can get a bit fuzzy.
*  None of it is "stand alone" - i.e. it is not an independent  profit center that is permitted  by the MNINC
headquarters  to more or less do as it sees fit, independently  of the rest of the organization,  as long as
it makes a profit.  Rather, it is part of a strategic  plan by one or more multinationals  to optimize
locations  of various parts of one or more production  chains that have production  locations in various
countries  and markets in various (same and/or  other) countries. This "plan" may be internal to one
MNC, to get or maintain a competitive  edge in some final or intermediate  markets, or it may be a
coordinated  plan of more than one MNC, with some sort of strategic  alliance,  tacit or explicit, among
them.  The best single empirical distinguishing  characteristic  may be that the location decision in
question  depended  on other location  decisions.
*  Labor intensive activities fall within this globalizing  FDI if the labor in question  is highly educated
and highly  skilled,  and the activity  is closely linked  with other operations  of the MNC. A lot cf this
is in what are de facto  service activities, although some are in companies that are clearly service
companies  while other are service parts of manufacturing  companies (e.g. engineering  or software
design of manufactured  products).  Thus, writing computer code in Bangalore or designing  high-
pressure  boilers  for electric power generation  plants in China should  be included.
Globalizing  FDI will not go to second-best  locations (however defined) because its companiies
operate under severe  competitive  pressures  that in effect do not permit second-best  locations. Since  very
little globalizing  FDI is tied to any one country  - although it may be tied to a region - it is free to avoid
unfavorable  locations. In operational  terms, and in addition to the characteristics  of a good investnent
environment  that are described  in the main  text of this paper,  globalizing  FDI in particular  wants:
*  An absence  of restrictions and requirements  and harassment  by govermment,  especially  on entry (i.e.
establishment of  foreign-invested firms),  imports,  exports,  percentage  foreign  ownership,
employment of expatriates, and local procurement.  Restrictions both on establishment and on
14operations  are im]portant;  globalizing  FDI requires  flexibility  to alter its mode  of production,  process,
and sources  of procurement,  without  having  to get time-consuming  or risky government  permission.
*  High-quality  transportation  and telecommunication  links  with the rest of the world.
*  Some  kind of minimaLl  quality-of-life;  e.g. absence  of significant  crime/corruption.
Both of the older  kinds of FDI still operate  and can be quite valuable  for a country  to attract. But
the globalizing  F:DI  is the main kind that serves  dynamic  markets,  and is automatically  high-productivity.
It is therefore the most valuable  kind to try to attract.  World B3ank  (FIAS) research and experience
suggest  that only about a dozen developing  and transition  countries  are attracting significant  amounts  of
globalizirng  FDI.
The Case  of Mexico. Throughout  the 1950s,  '60s and '70s the Mexican  economy  grew steadily,
with exceptional  macroeconomic  stability  and an import-substitution  strategy. Its large market limited
the inefficiencies  inherent in this strategy, as did its long border with the United States, which kept
protection  levels below the extremes  of some South  American  countries  that also erected  high barriers  to
import  competition.
FDI came to Mexico  mainly to serve the domestic  market. High production  costs, the result of
both natural  factors  such as deficient infrastructure  and poorly  educated  workers  and also policy-imposed
factors  such as domestic procurement requirements, were Fassed on to Mexican consumers,  and most
foreign-invested  companies did not export - indeed, they could not be competitive  in export markets.
The exception was the maquiladora industry, which began as simple labor-intensive  assembly of
garments and electrical assemblies; parts were imported from the LUS  and products re-exported to the US,
under a provision of UTS  law that limited duties to the value added in Mexico.
P'etroleunn,  petrochemicals,  all infrastructure  services, banking and finance, and many other
sectors were closed to foreign investors.  Except for the mnaquiradoras  and the automotive industry,
foreign investors  were restricted  to less than 50 percent ownership?  of a company  (in some sectors, less
than 400%),  and this severely  limited  FDI in contrast  to countries  such as Brazil where no such limitations
were imposed. I'he ownership  restrictions  were especially  important  impediments  to high-tech, cutting
edge technology, and globalizing FDI that needs to export, because multinationals do not want to share
their best technology withl  foreign partners that are forced upon thLem,  and cannot plan to supply export
markets competitjively  if they cannot assure production at world standards of quality and price.
LIcreasing  inflation in the 1970s,  the first devaluatio.n  in 25 years in 1976,  and the exhaustion  of
import substitution  possibilities ended this era of stable growth.  Explosive growth in hydrocarbon
exports, which  began in the 1970s, turned out to be more a curse than a blessing as Mexico's  fiscal and
exchange  rate policies were allowed  to deteriorate  in a wave of excessive  overconfidence.  With the debt
crisis of 1  982,  the,  need for a new approach  became  acute and obvious  to all.
Mexico implemented macroeconomic  reforms beginning in August 1982 in order to  reduce
inflation,  service  its restructured  debt, and stabilize  the economy. The balance  of payments  problem  was
solved, in a static sense, very quickly  although  with much  pain. But it soon  became clear that to resume
growth  Mexico  would need to complement  these reforms  by a more liberal  trade and investment  regime  -
- consistent  with the  global  operations  of multinational  firms,  and  indeed to provide  the appropriate
framework for M:exican-owned firms to attain international competitiveness  as well.  As the economy
recovered  in the  mid-1980s,  trade  barriers were  eliminated, both  imports  and  exports  rose, and FDI
15became essential  --  not only to  finance the  external  deficit,  but mainly  to  increase  efficient  export
capacity and employment.
Following the trade  liberalization  in the mid-1980s, the  first  move to  liberalize  FDI canme  in
1989.  By then it had become obvious that the most dynamic trade flows were generated by multinational
firms who would specialize in the production of one or a few products, not only selling them in Mexico
but also exporting them to the world.  Such operations required the freedom to import, expand capacity,
and change products or processes without restriction or even delays while awaiting government approval.
New  regulations  on  foreign  investment,  issued  in  1989,  were  drastic  modifications  in the
restrictive  law which dated from 1973.  The regulations  liberalized FDI establishment in several ways,
and were complemented by liberalization of regulatory practice that was just  as important, even though it
was informal.  Formally, majority Mexican equity was no longer required, except in a few sectors such as
banking, oil, and electricity,  if a proposed investment met  certain criteria.  In practice virtually  every
normal  investment was  deemed to  meet  these  criteria,  and  permission  was  given  automatically  and
quickly; the only exceptions were undesirable  or truly  sensitive activities  such as toxic  waste  dumps,
gambling  casinos, weapons  assembly,  nuclear  technology,  etc.  The  regulations  also  simplified  the
registration procedures for foreign investors, and removed or simplified restrictions and red tape that had
previously been involved in government approval of various aspects of technology transfers.
Foreign investments that were within the restrictions on percentage ownership had not, and still
did not, need government approval - they were treated  as Mexican companies  in every way.  Blut for
foreign  investments that  wanted to  exceed the  limits, it had been  possible,  and  still was possible, to
request an exemption.  This exemption was granted (or refused) by an inter-ministerial body called the
National Foreign Investment Commission (Comision Nacional de Inversion Extranjera -- CNIE).  UJnder
the new regulations, the CNIE only had to rule over a much smaller number of exceptions to a much
more liberal regime.  Procedurally, the CNIE stopped its practice of detailed evaluation of requests  for
exemptions, with bargaining  on conditions  and, sometimes, refusal.  Instead, it processed applications
routinely and  approved virtually  every request,  without imposing conditions,  with the  few exceptions
noted above.
As to technology transfers, the former practice whereby the Ministry of Industry had to approve
all contracts for technology transfers was abolished.  The Ministry's  practice had been to evaluate these
contracts and in many cases to substitute its judgment  for that of the Mexican companies, both in regard
to  whether  the  particular  technology  was  or  was  not  appropriate,  and  in  regard  to  the  price  paid
(royalties, etc.).  Mexican private companies, the supposed beneficiaries of this practice, were the  Loudest
voices against it, and as of 1989 the practice was discontinued.
Overall, the change in Mexico's  attitude toward FDI went far beyond the change in regulations.
The Government's basic attitude  switched from suspicion and regulation, to promotion and facilitation.
As another part of the implementation of this change, the Government created a new autonomous agency,
the Mexican Investment Board, to promote FDI in Mexico.  Supported half by the government and half
by the private sector, the MIB has the task of attracting desired investment to Mexico and facilitating the
paper work of foreign investors with regulatory authorities, including those at the provincial govenmment
level.
These reforms, plus some recovery in domestic demand in the second half of the  1980s, brought
increased FDI flows, but only in 1989 did the amount reach $3 billion and in 1990 it fell by  10 percent.
Thus the government realized that its new FDI regulations and more liberal procedures were not enough
16to attract foreign capital in large amounts.  The next step was NAFTA, the free trade agreement with the
US and Canada.
NAFTA  negotiations  started  in  1991.  For  Mexico  the  main  objective  of  this  "free  trade"
agreement was in fact not free trade but rather to attract more world-class FDI.  Mexico already had very
good access to US markets, except for a few products where restrictions remained even under NAFTA.
The  investment dimensions  of this  trade  treaty  were both  explicit  and  implicit.  Explicitly,
NAFTA  was the  first  trade  agreement  to  contain  wide  anld specific  regulation  on  investrnent.  In
particular, the 'national treatment principle' commits the Government to guarantee to a North American
investor treatment which is just  as good as it gives to the national.  NAFTA  also  removed  restrictions
in  sectors, which the  1989 regulations  had  left protected,  such as car  parts,  banking, and  electricity
generation.  Beyond these explicit provisions, NAFTA made it much more difficult for future Mexican
governments to reverse the liberalizing reforms of the mid- and late-1980s.  By locking in those reforms,
the agreement greatly reduced uncertainty over the regulatory framework, as well as over market access
to North America.  This was another necessary dimnension  of a Mexican environment that would attract
globalizing FDI.
The automobile  industry  shows  how  FDI in Mexico  changed  with  globalization.  Created  in the 1950s,  the industry
for the most part produced high-cost cars and trucks of less than up-to-date technology.  Some parts were
imported,  but more  and more  were made in Mexico  as the government  imposed  domestic  content requirements  on
the assemblers. The aluto  assembly  industry  was not subject  to restrictions  on foreign  ownership,  but had to meet
requirements  for buying  parts within  Mexico.  In the auto parts sector a 49% restriction  on foreign ownership
remained  in place, protecting  Mexican-owned  auto parts producers. This last restriction  is now in a seven-year
phase out period  under  NAFTA.
Beginning  in the 1970s,  even before  the liberalization,  a search for economies  of scale led to the appearance  of a
few  auto parts producers,  some  with foreign  investment,  which  sold both to assem  bly plants in Mexico  and  also to
assembly  plants  in the United  States. Until  the late 1980s,  however,  such instances  were rare.
With the changes  that began in the mid-1980s,  automotive  exports have grown rapidly, and imports  have also
increased  as an extensive  network  come into existence  in which  products  and components  are traded  worldwide,
but especially  between  Mexicc,  and  the US.  The export of components,  including  high-tech  parts such as engines
and  transmissions,  was a result of major new investments  made in new plants in Mexico  by Ford, General  Motors
and Nissan.  These investments  represented  a change from previous investments  by the same firms, in that the
recent ones were designed  to play a specific role in the global strategy  of the parent company,  supplying  their
worldwide  network  from Mexico. Purely  Mexican-owned  auto parts producers  have also succeeded  in becoming
strategic  partners  in  these  networks,  notably  of Ford.
Mercedes  Benz, since  the 1980s  a minority  partner in a Mexican  truck  proclucer,  also reacted  to the reforms  and
made MexicD  a part of its North American  strategy. It acquired  control of its partner, and in 1992-93  invested
$300 million  in modernizing  and expanding  its facilities  including  the addition  of a passenger  car production  line.
The same transformation  took place with Xerox and IBM, which before the liberalization  were among the few
foreign invested  facilities in Mexico with a  significant presence in international  trade, and which since the
liberalization  have, along iwith  many new entrants  to this kind of activity,  dlramatically  increased  the world-wide
integration  of their  Mexican  subsidiaries.
17FDI flows into Mexico started to increase again as investors anticipated the effects of NAFTA
and continuing liberalization in Mexico.  In 1991 the amount exceeded $4 billion for the first time, and
has continued to rise since then.  Much of this increase was in globalizing FDI, in response to the trade
liberalization and the expectation of a successful NAFTA negotiation, but the expectation of growth in
the Mexican market was also an important driving factor.
There were still important de facto  obstacles to  globalizing FDI coming  to Mexico  during the
early 1990s.  For greenfield investments (new, wholly-owned factories) the reforms were sufficient.  But
mergers,  acquisitions,  and  joint  ventures  were  still  impeded  by  a  combination  of  remaining  legal
restrictions in some key sectors and by informal mechanisms. Despite the change in regulatory practice in
1989, the reluctance  of domestic  investors to  give up  operational  control to foreigners  was partly  an
inheritance of past policies and practices.  In addition,  large Mexican conglomerates were strong, cash
rich,  had  long experience  with  local markets,  and  were  the beneficiaries  of privatizations  and  close
relations  with the  government.  These  factors kept  the  level of FDI below  $5  billion  per  year,  even
though there was great expectation of successful NAFTA negotiations.
In  1993, with NAFTA  approval in the near  future and  a more favorable political climate, the
government codified both the regulations  of 1989 and the coming NAFTA  rules on FDI in a new FDI
Manufacturing  is not the only part of the economy in which world-class  law.  The  old  1973  law  was
production  is important. Telecommunications  service is crucial  to provide  repealed.  This  new  law  made
an environment  in which companies  can achieve world-competitive  costs,  few  de  facto  changes  in  the
quality and time of delivery. Southwestern  Bell Corp (SBC) of the USA  liberal climate that had prevailed
wanted  to invest in Mexico  but was legally  unable to own control in a local  since  1989,  but  by  putting  the
telephone  company, even under the 1989 law.  SBC nevertheless  took a  new rules and practices in a law,
minority  position in Tehmex,  the formerly  government-owned  and operated  rather  than  in  regulations  vwhich
telecom monopoly that was being. privatized, in  1990.  SBC provide  could  be  more  easily  changed,
technology  and fnance to the newly  privatized  firm  with an investment  of $1  reduced  still  f'urther  any
billion.  This investment  is an integral  part of SBC's international  operation  uncertainty  that  investors might
and plans, which include  France, South  Africa, Switzerland  and Brazil. Its  haveramt  the  futurs  the
recent acquisition  of Ameritech  indicates  further impetus  in the globalizing  have  about  the  future  cf  the
FDI, as Ameritech  holds large international  operations. There is little doubt  reforms.
that  SBC  would  further  expand  its  involvement  in  Mexico  as
communications  between Mexico  and  the  US  expand,  especially if  Ironically, at the end of the  same
remaining  restrictions  on local telephones  are removed.  year that NAFTA  was approved,
Similarly,  the opening of the banking system to FDI in 1995, encouraged  1994, risky  monetary and  credit
Citibank  to be the first US bank to acquire a Mexican commercial  bank,  policies  by  the  outgoing
Confia.  This  acquisition, in  the  context  of  subsequent  additional  Administration  in  M'[exico
liberalizations  of banking regulations,  will enable Citibank to  expand its  precipitated  another  foreig  debt
deposit  base and to provide  a full range of world-class  services  to all clients  crisis.  One  othe  fewgood
in Mexico. Operations  of Citibank  and Confia are now part of the global  cffses.  One  of  the  few  good
system  of credit  management  of Citibank.  effects  of this  painful crisis was
to  accentuate  the  attractiveness
of  Mexico  for  globalizing  FDI
and to remove or reduce many of
the  most important  remaining obstacles.  The peso  devaluation improved export profitability,
while many producers of industrial materials wanted to be linked to a global network as a pre-
condition to  continue  in  operation.  In non-tradables,  however, profits  fell  and  some foreign
investors who had entered Mexico recently and who depended completely on Mexican consumer
demand, pulled  out.  This was the  case  of retailers  JC' Penny  and K-Mart,  or franchises  like
Twinnings.
18In 1995 and 1996 the Government  liberalized  FDI in natural gas distribution and the banking
sector, even though these  had remained restricted even after NAFTA.  Foreign investors responded
quickly.  All of the recent regional gas distribution concessions  to private enterprise include foreign
parties in partnership  vwith  a local business,  such as Repsol of Spain, Gas de France and Novo Industries
of California.  Gas deregulation gave additional impetus to the earlier liberalization in  electricity
generation, as the new generators will use gas as a fuel.  In electricity both GE and Mitsubishi
participated  in the first two private  generation  projects, approved  in 1996  and 1997.
The share of M&A  increased  sharply  as many local fir-ms  faced losses from the peso devaluation
and were unable to maintain operations  without  a link to foreign markets and global networks. At the
same time, the government  removed  many of the remaining sectoral  restrictions on foreign  ownership,
importantly  in backing, gas, and electricity  generation. Foreign investors came to control some of the
firms in which  they had entered  initially  with a minority  stake, suchl  as the retailer Cifra (now  controlled
by WalMart),  Iusacell (a cellular  telephone  firm  now controlled  by Biell  Atlantic)  and many banks.
Much globalizing  FDI went into maquiladoras,  which left behind the simple assembly  focus of
their beginnings  decades earlier and came to include quite a few complex,  medium- or even high-tech
manufacturing  processes. It is estimated  that 90% of maquilcr  investment  during the last few years is of
thie  globalizing  type. Although  many  existing  plants still have  a limited focus on assembling  from largely
foreign components,  even they are gradually  comprising  more complex processes. One example  is the
large Delphi  plants  owned by GM, employing  many  Mexican  engineers  in product  design. The standards
of operation,  quality, and efficiency  of these plants are of the same or higher levels than those of their
sister plants in North America. Other examples include  AT&T, GM, Emerson  Electric and Sony. This
change towards sophisticated,  integrated  manufacturing  anticipates  the de facto end of the maquiladora
status, as under NAFTA any exporter from Mexico to the US or Canada will benefit from the same
privileges  as do the maquiiadoras,  after a seven-year  phase-out  period  that ends in 2001.
Large  acquisitions,  an  intensification  of  globalizing  manufacturing  activity,  and  more
deregulation  thus explain the jump in FDI inflows from 1994 onwvards.  Most of this FDI was of the
globalizing  type.
Summary. A summary  view of the policy changes described  here, and the results in terms of
FDI flows to Mexico, is presented  in the Table 1. The story in its simplest  form is that Mexico  executed
a series of reforms in three areas of policy,  over a period  of about 14  years (from 1982  to 1996):
*  Monetary,  fiscal, and exchange  rate reforms,  to stabilize  the economy,  began in 1982.
*  Trade reforms, which liberalized imports (licensing was abolished and tariffs lowered) followed
around 1985.
*  Removal  of restrictions  on FDI  began in  1989, with the  freeing of more  and  more sectors  from
restrictions  on the percentage of foreign ownership, abolition of TRIMS (notably, domestic content
requirements),  and  the privatizations  of former  govermrient monopolies and  the  opening of those
sectors to FDI. NAFTA, negotiated  during the early '90s and implemented  in 1994, increased  and
lockecl  in all those,  reforms in both trade and foreign investment  rules.  Other regulations which
restricted the freeclom  of foreign-invested  finns to change their operations were also abolished or
relaxed. Additional  sectors were liberalized  in 1995  and 1996.
19The results have included a remarkable increase in the quantity of FDI inflows, rising from the
levels around  $2 billion  per  year  in the  late  1980s, to  around $4  billion  during  the early  1990s and
averaging $10 billion per year since 1994.  But even these dramatic increases in amounts are perhaps less
important than the changes in quality, as most of the additional FDI during the last five years has created
world-class facilities that are competitive in price and  quality with  others all  over the world,  and that
therefore can, and do, include Mexico as parts of the global strategies of multinational corporations.  The
days of high-cost, old technology factories producing for Mexican consumers only are gone, as are the
days of manufactured  exports consisting  mostly of simple, low-value-added products  based  on  cheap
Mexican labor.  Mexico today is more and more integrated in world-class production  linkages, and this
includes not only foreign-invested companies but also a growing number of purely Mexican firms that
have also taken advantage of the changed policy framework.
Table 1
Foreign  Direct  Investment  in Mexico  and  Policy  Changes:  1989-97
($ bn or percentages)
Approximate  Approximate  Shares  Estimated
Shares  (%)  Shares (%)  Policy Changes
$ FDI  Non-  of
Inflow  M&A  Greenfiel  Tradable  Tradable  globalizing
s  d  s  s  FDI
1989  3.0  10  90  40  60  30  New  FDI  regulations  - elimination  of
I  l  __  I  I  l  ______  51%  Mexican  majority  in most sectors
1990  2.6  10  90  40  60  40  Privatization  of telephones,  mining,  steel,
:________ _______  _  ____tourism,  airlines
1991  4.8  20  80  40  60  50  NAFTA  negotiations  begin
1992  4.4  20  80  40  60  60  Privatization  of banks, financial  system
=___=______l_  reforms
1993  4.4  30  70  40  60  60  Inmminent  NAFTA  approval,  new FDI
law codifyfing  the 1989  regulations,  more
_______  _  _________  __________  _____________  privatizations
1994  11.0  30  70  40  60  70  NAFTA  approval,  relaxed FDI
restrictions
1995  9.5  50  50  80  20  80  Economic  crisis;  deregulation  in gas,
electricity
1996  7.6  50  50  85  15  90  Banking  system  opening  to FDI[
1997  12.1  60  40  85  15  90  Long distance  telephone,
communications  deregulation
Source: Bank  of Mexico  on FDI flows  and  FIAS'  estimates  on shares.
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Summary  findings
In Uzbekistan  state enterprises  are being changed  into  Reforming  competition  policy  institutions  and legal
shareholding  companies,  and private  enterprises  account  frameworks  in line with the country's  goal of
for 45 percent of all registered firms. But business  strengthening structural reforms and improving
decisions  to set prices,  output, and investment  are often  macroeconomic  policy.
not market-based,  nor wholly  within the purview  of  * Improving  the ability  of government  and associated
businesses, especially those in commercial manufacturing  institutions to assess Uzbekistan's industrial market
and services.  structure and the determinants of enterprise conduct and
Lines of authority  for  corporate  governance  - from  performance.
state enterprises to private enterprises - are ill-defined,  * Making the authority responsible for competition
so there is little discipline on corporate performance and  and regulatory policymaking into an independent agency
little  separation  between  government  and  business.  - a "champion"  of competition  - answerable  directly
Nascent frameworks have been created for  to the prime minister.
competition policy (for firms in the commercial sector)  *  Strengthening incentives and institutions  for
and regulatory policy (governing utilities in the  corporate governance and bringing them in line with
infrastructure monopoly sector). But implementation and  international practice.
enforcement have been hampered  by old-style  *  Subjecting infrastructure monopolies to systemic
instruments (such as price controls) rooted in central  competitive restructuring and unbundling, where
planning, by lack of a strong independent regulatory  appropriate.  For other utilities, depoliticize tariff setting
rule-making authority, by the limited understanding of  and implementation of regulations; ensure that price,
the basic concepts of competition and regulatory reform,  output,  and investment decisions by service suppliers are
and by weak institutional capabilities for analyzing  procompetitive (creating a level playing field among
market structure and business performance.  users); and increase transparency and accountability to
Based on fieldwork in Uzbekistan, Broadman  the public.
recommends:
- Deepening senior policy officials' understanding of,
and appreciation of the benefits from, enterprise
competition  and  how  it affects  economic  growth.
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Like most Central  Asian republics,  Uzbekistan  has adopted  a gradual and cautious  approach  in its
transition  to a market  economy. 1 Although  some measure  of success  has been achieved  in attaining  short-
term macroeconomic  stability, 2 microeconomic  reforns have lagged behind.  The policy agenda for
structural  reform  r  emains  formidable.
An active tiransfornation  of Uzbek state-owned  enterPrises  (SOEs) into shareholding  companies
has been underway and private  enterprises account for 45 percent of the total number of registered finns
(where the vast majority of private firms are of small and medium scale).  But business decisions to set
prices, outtput  and investrnent are often not market-based, nor wholly within the purview of businesses,
especially those operating in the commercial manufacturing and services sectors, and this creates market
distortions and misallocation of resources.  Lines of authority for corporate governance are ill-defined, not
only in SDEs and State "trade associations", but also in privatized firms, engendering weak external and
internal disciplines on  corporate performance, and  little effective separation between  government and
business.  While  nascent  legal  frameworks  for  both  competition  policy,  governing  firms  in  the
commercial  sector,  and  regulatory policy,  goverming firms  in the  infrastructure ("utility")  monopoly
sector, have been creaLted,  implementation and enforcement hiave been hampered by the use of old-style
instruments rooted in central planing (e.g., uniform market s3hare  monopoly registration, price controls,
etc.),  the  lack  of  a  strong  independent  regulatory  rule-making  authority,  poor  understanding  of
competition and  regulatory reforn  concepts, and weak institutional capabilities for analysis of market
structure and business peiformance.
The experience from other transition countries demonistrates that  successfully dealing with these
problems  are  critical  for  laying  the  structural  basis  for  robust  and  enduring  growth.  Uzbekistan's
government is cognizant  of these  challenges and  recognizes that  without effectively  addressing  them,
there are pronounced risks that the overall economic reformn  program could be undermnined. Indeed, one
of the key items on the government's  policy agenda, as part of its comprehensive program of economic
reforms for the period 2000-2005, as outlined in the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 296 of June 10,
1999, is to develop new structural reforms that improve Uzbekistan's competitive business environment. 3
This paper-based  on fieldwork in Uzbekistan-outlines  recommendations for developing such a
structural  reform  program.  Six  main  policy  challenges  are identified,  and  the  paper  is  organized
according to those challenges:  (i) concepts of competition anid  regulation in a market economy appear to
be  not  well  understood  both  by  policy-makers  and  market  participants;  (ii)  the  formulation  and
implementation of competition and regulatory policies are poorly linked to the core objectives and design
of the Governnment's  overall economic  reform program; (iii) the  Government has developed a  limited
knowledge base and capacity for analysis of the country's  industrial structure and deterrninants of a more
competitive  business  environment;  (iv)  the  organizational  and  functional  independence  of  the
Government's authority for formulating and enforcing competition and regulatory policies, as well as the
system for effective checks and balances to ensure strong public transparency and accountability,  are
weak; (v) corporate  governance  incentives  to instill strong competitive  discipline  on firms' performance
and to engender effective separation between govermmerrt  and business, especially in  state owned
"associations" and related holding groups are blunted; anid  (vi) there is substantial scope both for
competitive  restructuring  and  unbundling  of  infrastructure  monopolies, especially  those  that  are not
"naturally" monopolistic, and for reform of regulatory oversi.ght  of infrastructure monopoly enterprises to
a strong rules-based regime.
i See Karimov  (1998).
2 See Zettelmeyer  (1998).
3For  a description  of the overall  reform  program  see World  Bank (1999).Because many of the  structural problems  found  in Uzbekistan  are common with  those in other
Central Asian republics, the analysis presented and the policy recommendations developed in this paper
are applicable beyond Uzbekistan per se.
II.  UNDERSTANDING  OF CONCEPTS  OF COMPETITION AND REGULATION
Institutional  Framework.  Uzbekistan has made substantial progress since the advent of reform to
develop an institutional framework to  foster the establishment of a competitive  business environment.
While  the  framework is  still  evolving,  to  date  it  includes,  among  other  measures  and  actions,  the
establishment of the Anti-Monopoly Committee (AMC), which is housed within the Ministry of Finance;
development of program entitled The Concept of State Anti-Monopoly Policy, which formulates the main
objectives of the Government's competition and regulatory policy; and enactment of several laws, such as
the  laws  "On  Competition  and  Restriction of Monopoly  Activity  in  Commodity Markets",  "C)n  the
Limitation of Monopolistic Activity", "On Natural Monopolies", "On Protection of Consumers'  Rights",
and "On Advertising".
As  articulated  in  the  Concept  of  State  Anti-Monopoly  Policy,  the  central  objectives  of  the
Government's competition and regulatory reform program-implemented  by the AMC-are  to develop
competition  and  entrepreneurship  in  Uzbekistan's  economy;  regulate  the  activities  of  monopoly
enterprises; prevent  abuse  by  firms with  dominant  market positions;  enforce  sanctions  on  firims who
engage in unfair competition; and protect consumer rights.
The  nascent  institutional  framework  and  policy  objectives  are  generally  consistent  with
international practice.  In trying to achieve the objectives, however, Uzbekistan's  authorities face a key
challenge: ensuring that policy officials in all key agencies and ministries (at both the national and local
levels) as well as market participants-businesses  (including SOEs, the Privatization Investment  Funds
(PIFs) and banks), consumers, workers, and the general public-both  understand the basic concepts of
competition and regulation,  and  are motivated to  act  in  such a way  as to capitalize  on the  role that
competitive forces can play in fueling economic prosperity and growth.  There are several areas where
this challenge is partiCularly proncunced and where there is a priority for action-in  particular mobi:lizing
training, pragmatic policy advice and public education about competition and regulation.
Monopoly  Register.  One of the primary instruments by which the AMC implements competition
policy is through its Register of Monopoly Enterprises - a policy instrument common to Russia and. many
other CIS countries. 4 Uzbek enterprises that are deemed as "dominant"-  defined by statute as generally
having a market share of at least 65 percent, and under certain conditions  a market share of at least 35
percent - are listed on AMC's Register and therefore must declare (register) their prices and prolfits  for
AMC approval.  In addition, registered monopolists, once they agree with their input sellers and output
buyers on volumes, delivery times, and other conditions (as well as prices) must register these transaction
terrms with the AMC along with their  expected profits.  In certain  cases-typically  for  infrastructure
("utility") monopolies-the  AMC directly determines prices and profits.
As  of  October  1,  1999 there  were  716  enterprises  and  1,924  products  listed  in  the" AJMC's
Monopoly  Register,  of which  91  enterprises  and  205 products  were  registered  as monopolies  at  the
national  (Republic)  level, with  the  remaining  (and  vast  majority)  of  monopoly  firms  and  products
registered in the AMC's  14 regional offices.  Table 1 indicates the sectoral distribution of the registered
monopolies.  In  Uzbekistan  there  are  approximately  176,800  firms with  business  licenses,  the  vast
4 A description  of Russia's competition  policy  framework  is contained  in Broadman  (2000).
2majority of which are small and medium scale.  Private firms account for about 45 percent of the total
number of registered businesses.
Table 1: Uzbekistan  Enterprises  Registered  by the Anti.Monopoly  Committee  as Monopolies
(Republic  and Local  Levels;  as of October  1, 1999)
Sectors  Numnber  of Enterprises  Number  of
Products
Bakery,  grain  and flour  18  40
Coal  mining  5  6
Natural  Gas  4  5
Food  97  551
Light  industry  30  62
Local  industry  11  22
Petrochemicals  8  33
Machinery  30  63
Construction  materials  71  199
Furniture  16  48
Metallurgy  5  9
Services  323  690
Others  80  157
Total  716  1924
Sou.rce: Uzbekistan Anti-Monopoly Committee
Price Control vs. AMonitoring. Senior management of the AMC recognizes that reliance on price
and profit control is neither an efficient or desirable approach to adlvance competition in the commercial
sectors, and that the process is creating misallocation of resciurces in the economy.  Accordingly, as set
out in Major Strategic Measures to Improve the Operations cf the AMC, the Committee has set a goal to
switch to a system of imonitoring by end-2000.  However, neither the AMC nor the business community
has adequate capacity to appreciate fully how to make the transition to a system of monitoring and draw
lessons from internaticnal experience in this regard.
Defining  iEconomic  Market  Boundaries.  More  fimdamentally,  there  appears  to  be  poor
understanding of and  confusion about the basic concepts  oF competition needed to  implement such a
system, such as: definition  of product  and  geographic  market boundaries  (allowing for  economically
meaningful measures  of  market  share  and  dominance ratlher than  application  of  statutorily  defined
quantitative formulae that artificially classify firms as monopolies); price  and cross-elasticites to gauge
market demand and  product  substitutability; marginal  and fixed  costs  and  their relationship to  price-
setting and profit maximization; seller and buyer concentration; determinants of barriers to entry and exit;
3 etc.  The staff of the AMC, with the assistance of international experts, has been undergoing training in
competition issues over the past year, and the AMC has recently developed a Workplan for  Training and
Assistance for the future that, if implemented, could help remedy some of these deficiencies.
Strategic Firms. Another key component of the AMC's  program is development of plans for the
"demonopolization"  of certain  sectors and enterprises  in the Uzbekistan  economy.  This is a laudable
objective: the competitive restructuring of many of Uzbekistan's  industries should be a high priority item
on  the  Government's  reform  agenda.  Yet  as  described  in  the  draft  Program  of  Formation  of  a
Competitive Environment for  2000-2005, tabled with the Cabinet of Ministers in late 1999, the proposed
mechanisms for  such restructuring are  at  variance with  an approach  based  on  economic  concepts of
competition.
Twenty-nine  sectors/firms  are  identified  as  candidates  for  demonopolization,  ranging  from
champagne and cognac production to backpacks and toilet soap to mayonnaise and various oil products.
It is dubious that  some of the sectors  identified would truly  qualify as strategically  important for the
boosting the economy's  competitiveness and worth the government expending its limited resources, and
political capital on  restructuring.  Moreover,  in some cases,  the  indicated market  shares targeted  for
reduction are unlikely to signal monopoly power; for example, the backpack producer has a 37% market
share, and the refinery producing diesel fuel and fuel oil has market shares of 20% in the former ancl 15%
in the latter.  Clearly, implementation of demonopolization is a complex  endeavor for any  government
and must be done with great care so as to not engender new distortions in the economy.  In this regard,
there  is a need for further  articulation of Uzbekistan's  demonopolization  strategy and the mechanisms
used for its implementation.
Competition Legislation. Improvements of the existing legislative framework for competition and
regulatory policy are also needed, and this is recognized by the AMC as a priority area for reform.  The
Committee has identified, with the assistance of international experts, several areas where amendments or
new legislation are needed, including demonopolization in commodity markets, anti-collusion measures,
shareholder and property rights protection, rate-setting for regulated utility monopolies, false advertising,
and  consumer  rights  protection.  In  this  context,  the  use  of  legislative  concepts  from  international
experience could be extremely useful in legislative drafting.  Equally important, success in passage and
implementation of any new legislation in this area will be greatly furthered by a deeper understandiing of
such  concepts  by  members  of  the  legislature  and  the  affected  groups-businesses,  workers  and
consumers.  Accordingly outreach and education efforts along these lines should thus be developed.
Public Education  and Outreach. More generally, non-governmental  organizations (NGOs) could
play an important role in public education  about the benefits of competition in furthering Uzbekisian's
economic  development.  As in  other countries,  establishment  of independent  non-profit  "competition
education"  foundations,  which  would  be  perceived  by  society  as  non-partisan,  could  leverage  the
Government's  own public  outreach  efforts.  In  some countries,  such  groups  have  also  taken  on  an
ombudsman  role,  providing  a  very  effective  neutral  vehicle  for  airing  consumers'  complaints about
business violations, corruption and  inefficiencies in government programs.  Such a  process can  instill
greater  "ownership"  by  the  population  of  market  reforrns  and  help  motivate  their  acceptance  and
behavioral change.
IH. LINKING  COMPETITION POLICY TO THE STRUCTURAL  REFORM PROGRAIVI
Fostering an improved business environment in Uzbekistan is a core  objective of the authorities'
economic reform program.  Yet to date, competition and regulatory policies and the specific goals they
are designed to achieve, have not been fully incorporated within the Government's  broader structural and
4macroeconomic  reform programs;  nor at the same time have the development  and implementation  of
these other refoim objectives been adequately inforned by the market-oriented  goals of enhancing
competitive  forces.
Removing Barrier. to New Entrants and Restructurinig  Incumbents.  In general,  the emphasis  of
the existing competition  policy regime has focused on dealing with the regulation of incumbent  firms.
But as part of the broader objectives  of encouraging  structural reform and the transition to a market
system, a  greater orientation is needed towards generating growth through the formation of new
enterprises,  not just via privatization  of existing  SOEs, but niore importantly,  through "greenfield"  entry
of new start-ups--both  domestic  investors  and foreign  investors. The experience  of many other  transition
economies  suggests  that new entrants,  particularly  small  and medium  enterprises  (SMEs),  are the engines
of growth and job creation.  In Uzbekistan,  recent surveys suggest that potential new businesses  face
substantial  administrative  and policy barriers  to entry, including  elaborate  licensing requirements  at both
the national and local levels; impeded access to foreign  exchange;  difficulty  in arranging  for financing
from banks or other sources; arbitrary and burdensome  taxation;,  difficulties in arranging for product
distribution,  among  others. 5 Focusing  on developing  solutions  to these problems as part of the broader
structural  reform  agenda is critical  to boosting  competition.
Exit of Nonviable  Firms and Hardening  Budget Constraints. By the same token, relatively  little
policy  ermphasis  has  been directed  toward facilitating  bankruptcy,  including  where necessary,  liquidation,
of insolvent firms in Uzbekistan.  The concerns about the potential social costs of such actions is
understandable. Yet, with adequate  social safety nets in place, such costs can be substantially  reduced.
International  experien,ce  can provide  to the Uzbekistan  authorities  iimportant  lessons  about  the benefits  of
reducing  fiscal and financial  subsidies  to firns-"hardening  budget constraints"-to  engender  improved
corporate  competitiveness  from viable firms and to expose those t]hat  are no longer commercially  viable.
Indeed, viewed from the broader structural reform perspective, the bankruptcy process engenders
important  benefits: it provides  for the re-channeling  of productive  assets bottled up in inefficient  firms to
new ventures  where employment  can be expanded  and new Products  created. Importantly,  facilitating  the
bankruptcy  process should not be seen as simply in the purview of the government;  indeed, on the
contrary,  the main focus should be on strengthening  the legal rights of creditors in Uzbekistan. In turn
this means  accelerating  reformn  of the country's banking  system to one where banks' credit, lending  and
debt collection  decisions  are scrupulously  made on the basis of commercial  and risk criteria. Exacting
such external  discipline  on the performnance  of firms in the real sector  will go along  way to fostering  the
competitive  restracturing  of Uzbekistan'  s industry.
Openness  to International  Trade and Liberalization!  of Foreign Exchange.  Trade and foreign
exchange restrictions in Uzbekistan are pronounced. They serve to shelter noncompetitive  industries
from market forces and  as  a  result encourage misallocation of  resources, lost  output and  poor
product/service  qualily. Restrictive  trade practices,  such as r  egistration  and prepayment  requirements  for
imports and high average import tariffs, were enacted in 1997 and remain in place.  State trading
monopolies  for cotton and gold exports, which generate approximately  40% of the country's foreign
exchange earnings, also undermine competition within the economy.  At the same time, the dual
exchange  rate systemi  and foreign exchange  surrender  requirements  engender gross structural  distortions
in the economy. Removal of the trade and foreign  exchange  restrictions  is widely  seen as a pre6ondition
for enhancing  the competitiveness  of the economy and for putting Uzbekistan on a path for enduring
growth. Indeed,  although  liberalization  of the foreign  exchange  regime is often seen as a macroeconomic
policy objective, its impacts on advancing the competitive structure of the economy are as critical.
Equally important,  accession to the WTO provides an important  vehicle to reform the country's trade
regime ;and  to lock-in, under international  commitments,  the removal of existing trade restrictions;
5 LaFleur (1999); AMCHAM Uzbekistan (1999).
5through the prism of identifying potent reforms to  instill competition within the Uzbekistan economy,
WTO accession should be a clear priority for the Government.
Improving the Policy Regime for  Foreign Direct Investment  Improving the legal and regulatory
regime  governing  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  inflows  to  Uzbekistan  should  be  seen as  another
important policy component of the broader structural reform program to enhance competition within the
country's  industrial  base.  FDI  inflows  not  only mean  the  transfer  of financial  resources,  but  more
importantly usually mean the economy is host to the transfer of advances in technology, the introduction
of  new  products  and  production  processes,  enhancements  in  managerial  and  technical  skills,  and
competitive pressure on domestic firms to perform more efficiently.  Bringing Uzbekistan's  FDI policy
regime in line with international best practice would entail, among other measures that would facilitate
new  entry:  providing  for  non-discriminatory,  "national  treatment"  to  foreign  investors;  phasing  out
existing  trade-related  investment  measures  (e.g.,  local  content  restrictions,  export  performance
requirements and restrictions on use of foreign exchange); freedom for investment-related transfers (e.g.,
profits,  royalties);  binding  international  arbitration  for  investor-State  disputes;  and  international  law
standards for expropriation.6
Industrial Policy.  There is also the need for the design of country's  industrial policy program.  lto  be
better  informed  by-indeed  be  reconciled  with-the  Government's  emerging  competition  policy
objectives.  While the  latter is to give  emphasis to  greater use of market  forces  in the economy, the
industrial policy program still bears a heavy administrative  imprint and market control.  To illustrate the
problem, Box I shows how the draft Program of Formation of a Competitive Environmentfor  2000-2005
formulates the plan for the competitive restructuring (or demonopolization) of the cognac sector.  The
plan is striking for its detail as to the seemingly engineered changes in production and market shares for
the various producers in the sector.  It casts  strong doubt about any significant role  envisioned  by its
drafters that market forces will play in the sector's future structure.
Box 1: Restructuring  Plan for Joint  Stock  Company  (JSC) "Khovrenko":  Cognac  Producer
The current  (1999) market  share of JSC "Khovrenko"  is 41.3%. The plan is to reduce the share of the "monopolist"
on domestic  market  down  to 24-26%  by the year 2005 by increasing  the market  shares  of:
>  JSC "Yangiyul"  -from 18%  in the year 2000 up to 20-22%  in the year 2005;
>  JSC "Shakhrud" - from 20% in 2000 up to 22-24%  in 2005;
>  JV "Bulungur"  - from 13%  in 2000  up to 15-18%  in 2005;
>  JSC "Urgench  Sharobi"  - from 7% in 2000 up to 8-9%  in 2005.
>  Increase  exports  of JSC "Khovrenko"  from  25% in 2000 up to 30% in 2005.
>  In the year 2005 JSC "Khovrenko"  will be excluded  from the State Registry  of Monopolists  since its market
share will be reduced.
Source: Annex II, Program  of Formation  of a  Competitive Environment for  2000-2005,  Government  of Uzbekistan;  dnlft of
October  1999.
6See  Bergsman, Broadman and Drebentsov (1999).
6IV.  ENHANCING  ANALYTICAL  CAPABILITIES
Effective economic policy formulation and implementation must be start with high quality and up-
to-date economic information and analysis.  Without a souncl  knowledge base about an economy's market
structure and the determinants  of finms' behavior, it is virtually  impossible to design competition  and
regulatory policies that will have their intended  impacts;  in fact under  such circumstances  it is quite
possible  that  best  intentioned  reforms  could  well  create  deleterious  outcomes  and  worsen  existing
problems.  Moreover, wvithout such information,  policy  formulation  in other  economic  spheres-for
example, in the area of macroeconomic reform, such as gauging the price and market impacts of foreign
exchange liberalization--will  be made more difficult and subject to errors.
Needfor  More Empirical  Assessments  of Competition.  Although improvements are underway-
in particular within the Center for Economic Research, a quasi-Government think-tank partly funded by
UNDP and TACIS--the  existing database on the structure of Uzbekistan's  industry is still rudimentary.
While  numerous  analyses  of  particular  commodity  markets  have  been  undertaken  (as  part  of  the
monopoly registry process) relatively few major empirical studies of the systemic determinants of market
power within key bottleneck sectors of the economy have bezn carried out.
Cross-SectorairAntalysis.  In addition, cross-sectoral analyses that assess structural and behavioral
linkages across industries and markets do not appear to have been undertaken:  for example, how price
distortions, prodluction i:nefficiencies and  bottlenecks  in the  infrastructure  monopoly  sectors,  such as
electric power, affect business performance by electric power consuming firms in the tradables sector,
such as cotton ginning.  Similarly there has been limited analysis of the competitive impacts of existing
horizontal and  vertical  integration,  and the  extent to which  current horizontal  and vertical  structures,
especially in the 56 "associations" and holding group structlres,  engender economies of scale and scope.
Without  this  integrative,  economy-wide  perspective,  the  formullation of  competition  and  regulatory
policies  on  a  "general  equilibrium"  basis  is very  difficult  and  instead  forces  policy-makers  to  base
decisions on only a partial view of the determinants of indusitrial  performance in the economy.
Statutory vs. Economic  Definitions  of Markets.  It also appears that the taxonomy of data that are
collected and analyzed is determined more by statutory than economic criteria.  For example, the data are
usually assessed according to the 65%l35%  legal classification of monopolies.  Rather what is needed is
analysis of data to determine the economic boundaries of markets (and thus firms' market shares), based
on questions of product substitutability and geographic limits of total delivered product costs relative to
demand,
Influence  of Market  Structure  on  Corporate Performance.  Equally important, there  is a  lack of
analysis of how conventional  elements of  industrial structure, such as seller  concentration, barriers to
entry, ownership  structure, among  other  factors,  influence the  competitive  conduct  of firms.  In this
regard it would be irmportant  to know on a cross-sectional basis as well as over time, what gives rise to
variations  amon,g Uzbekistan's  firms  in  terms  of  price-cost  margins  and  rates  of  return;  product
innovation and introduction of new processes; product  and service quality; access to and disposition of
domestic financing and earnings; incidence of foreign exchange; and export performance.
The AMC  and  t]he Center  for  Economic  Research recognize  the  deficiencies  in  the  existing
knowledge base  and analytical  capabilities.  Accordingly  they  have begun  to develop  action  plans to
remedy the situation.  Indeed the Center for Economic Research is currently establishing a new thematic
team  within the organization  that will focus  exclusively on  analysis  of competition  in the  economy.
Clearly, the knowledge-building agenda before the AMC and the Center is big, and it will take time to
implement.  Against the backdrop of limited human and financial resources to undertake this effort, it is
important that as the action plans are further refined priorities be set.  The set of issues identified above
7suggests areas for priority attention.  Yet even within those areas, data collection and analysis should be
tailored first toward apparent "worst offenders" and where large amounts of resources in the economy are
potentially at stake.
V. CREATING A COMPETITION "CHAMPION" WITHIN GOVERNMENT
The current Anti-Monopoly  Committee, which  was  established  by  Presidential  Decree  in May
1996, is an  outgrowth from the  earlier Committee  on  Prices,  which  played  a  central  role under  the
planned economic system.  This in part explains the AMC's  reliance on price controls as a competition
policy  instrument.  Although,  as noted  above, the  AMC has  set  itself  the  objective of  moving to  a
monitoring  type  of  system  in  the  near  future,  the  perception  by  marketplace  participants  of  the
organization's functions as a price (and other transaction terms) control agency will continue to be subject
to inertia from the past.
Organizational  Conflicts  of  Interest.  This  problem  is  compounded  by  the fact  that  the  Anti-
Monopoly Committee is actually part of the Ministry of Finance, with a Deputy Finance Minister serving
as the AMC chairman.  Housing the organization within the Finance Ministry is, again, an outgrowth of
the AMC's  earlier incarnation as the  Committee on  Prices.  Other transition  economies'  competition
agencies have had similar early organizational structures.  But effective formulation and enforcement of
competition and regulatory policies requires an agency with a cross-cutting, "honest broker" mandate.  It
also must be seen by all market participants-businesses,  workers, consumers and the general public-as
pursuing a  credible non-partisan  agenda.  In part this  means operating  independent of  line agencies,
including the Finance Ministry, which, by definition will have an interest in increasing revenues ancl  thus
may create an appearance of a conflict of interest if it has jurisdiction  over competition and regulatory
policy.  For  the  same  conflict-of-interest  reasons,  it  also  means  operating  the  competition  agency
independently of sectoral agencies.  Indeed international experience suggests that effective competition
agencies are those that operate in a de-politicized fashion and have the clout-the  "teeth"-to  deal with
powerful vested interests, not only in the  economy, but equally important  on an inter-agency basis  in
cabinet debates.
Lack  of Institutional  Resources.  The organizational  structure  of the AMC  is comprised  of a
Republic level headquarters office in Tashkent and 14 local level branch offices located in various regions
of the country.  The total number of AMC staff is 414 persons, of which 55 work at the national level; in
other words the vast majority of AMC officials work in the Committee's  branch offices at the local level.
The large allotment of staff in the regions reflects the emphasis of the AMC's activities at the local level.
For example, in addition to its monopoly registering and price/profit control functions (described earlier),
the AMC is involved in the promotion  of competition in selective sectors carried out by the  regional
offices in concert with local governments.  This includes, for example, establishing mechanisms to help
ensure that public procurements  at the local level are mediated through  open and competitive tenders.
The AMC is also involved at the local level in the promotion of specific investment projects in certain
sectors or geographic areas of the country; for example, fostering banks to make credit available to SMEs.
Local Level Focus  and Regulatory  Capture.  To be sure, the focus on strengthening competiti.on at
the local level is key, since that is where most business transactions are carried out.  But by the  same
token, in Uzbekistan, as in other transition economies with nascent economic institutions, that is vvhere
the  problem  of  "regulatory  capture"  is  often  most  pronounced  and  prevalent:  local  authorities  and
business interests are often co-mingled and there are weak systems for checks and balances.  However, it
appears that AMC practices and interpretation of statutes and regulations is not consistent across regions
and local markets.  Discretion  in enforcement appears to be exercised.  This of course only serves to
exacerbate the capture problem.  Moreover, the role AMC branch offices play in promoting projects at the
8local level, especially involvement in fostering bank credit  lines, makes the agency vulnerable to
regulatory  capture,  to say nothing  of the fact that such activities  undermine  the Government's  collateral
objective  of creating,  a rnarket-oriented  banking  sector. Of course, local government  officials  themselves
may be in violation  of competition  statutes-e.g., protecting  local businesses  from entry  through delaying
issuance  of new licenses;  provision of fiscal subsidies  to incumbent  firms; creating  an nonlevel playing
field regarding  energy prices charged  by local utilities to newcomers,  etc.-and  the AMC has brought
charges in such cases.  But without a strong, independent  AMC, it will be difficult to enforce the law
effectively  at the local level,  where the stakes are perhaps  highest.
N0eedfor  an independent Competition  Policy  Authority. There is a clear need to break from the
past and reinvigorate  thle  AMC as an agency independent  from the Ministry of Finance, with a new
mandate  and "corporate  culture". There is not a single  "best" model that the restructured  agency should
aim for.  Different countries use different organizational  set ups.  Among other schemes, some have
established  a unitary  independent  agency  that combines  all competition  and regulatory  policy functions;
some have established both an  independent  competition policy agency as well as an  independent
regulatory agency (or agencies);  and some have established portions of competition policy functions
within a ministry of justice as well as other portions in an independent  agency; etc.  But international
practice does suggest a set of principles upon which a revitalized  competition agency should operate.
Such principles  would likely include the following  elements:  (i) competition  policy/regulatory  decisions
should be rules-based,  judgements  made in an impartial, indepenident  fashion, and remedies devised  on
the merits of the case, in line with competition  policy objectives; (ii) the entity's budget should be
financially  autonomous  from other ministries;  (iii) the entity head should  have clear lines  of authority  and
appointed  and dismissed  by only the Prime Minister,  subject  to strict, well-defined  criteria,  and/or serve
for a fixed tenn; (iv) there should be a transparent appeals process for consumers and  businesses,
including  public hearings;  (v) the agency  should  have autonomous  legislative  authority;  (vi) the agency's
performance  should  be subject  to regular  public monitoring  to ensure the public interest  is protected;  (vii)
regional offices should be  sufficient in  number and  breadth to  ensure  effective oversight and
implementation  at sub-republic  level; and (viii) the agency should be staffed with adequate  number of
professionals  with the requisite  skills and technical  expertise.
Clearly, reorganizing  the AMC is a complex endeavor and will take time.  The task should be
undertaken as a deliberative  process with public discussion, especially involving the major affected
parties within the country. The advice of practitioners  from other countries should be sought so as to
learn  the lessons  of international  experience.  Nonetheless,  a structure  should  be established  that best suits
Uzbekistan's  ovsn  chlaracteristics  and challenges.
VI. STRENGTHENING  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  INCENTIVES
A critical comiponent  for the improvement of the bus:iness environment is the institution of market-
oriented  incentives  for  corporate  governance  practices.  In  Uzbekistan  sound  corporate  governance
practices are blunted because of  ill-defined corporate organizational structures and  institutions,
contradictory lines of authority, and weak disciplines/checks'and balances, especially in the management
of State assets. Although  Uzbekistan  has enacted  a Compary Lavw,  in practice  the structure  of the modern
corporation has not  yet been widely adopted in  the country. Uzbekistan's approach to  corporate
governance-particularly  in  the  key  firms,  which  still  have  heavily  state  involvement-shares  many
similarities with, China, Russia and other transition economies.'
7China's  state  asset management  approach  to corporate  governance  is described  in Broadman  (1999) and  World
Bank (1!997);  Russia's  post-privatization  corporate  governance  challenges  are described  in Broadman  (1999).
9The Modern Corporate Fornm Generically, there are four key  attributes of the modem  corporate
form worldwide; see Box 2.  They enable  the enterprise to mobilize  and  deploy financial and human
capital and transform inputs into outputs on a large scale efficiently.  The weakness or absence of one or
more  of the  attributes  significantly  impairs  the  corporation's  efficiency.  For example,  with  limited
transferability of ownership interests, the flexibility of owners to reallocate assets to higher-use values is
blunted.  This would distort the market value of the business, which indicates how well management is
performing.  Thus, weak transferability would undercut a powerful mechanism that disciplines corporate
management to satisfy owners'  goals of asset value maintenance and increase.
Operating a  large modem  corporation inevitably involves the separation of the firm's  ownership
from its  management.  The owners  select  managers to  run  the  firm,  and  in  the  process  the  owners
relinquish  some of  their control  as they  delegate  (some)  decision-making  to  managers.  "Corporate
governance" refers to the  set of relationships that link the  ownership and  control of an enterprise, the
mechanisms through which these relationships are mediated (e.g., monitoring  and  evaluation controls),
and the nature of incentives, risks and constraints that affect how the actions of a firm's owners, managers
and workers as well as others (e.g., banks, suppliers  and customers) influence  the firm's  conduct and
performance. 8 The classic problem of the owners is how to structure internally the corporate organization
and its operations in a manner that provides the proper incentives to managers for the attainment of the
owners'  goals.  At the same time, various external incentives discipline the conduct of managers and thus
ultimately affect firm performance (see Box 3).  International experience suggests that improved business
performance depends not only on how well a business implements the four key attributes that comprise
the modem corporate form, but also on the dynamic interplay of these internal and external incentives.
Box 2: The  Four Structural  Attributes  of the  Modern  Corporation
1.  Separate identity.  The corporation  is a legal entity distinct from its owners ("shareholders"),  with a clear
definition  of and accounting  for its own assets  and  liabilities;
2.  Limited liability for owners.  Owners' risk of financial loss is limited to their contribution to the
corporation's  capital;
3.  Centralized  role for corporate  management  and a board of directors.  The day-to-day  affairs of the
corporation  are conducted  by one or more persons  ("managers"),  who are hired by the owners. A board of
directors, elected by the owners, represents  the owners' interests  by giving direction to management  and
carrying  out oversight  of managers' performance;  and
4.  Transferability  of ownership  shares. The shareholders'  ownership  interests  are transferable,  and a tran7sfer
by an owner  does not, in itself, change  the rights and obligations  of the corporation  with respect  to its own
assets  and liabilities.
Source: Broadman  (1996)
Principal-Agent Problems. Providing  for sound corporate  governance is a challenge all modern
corporations the world over must meet.  It is difficult to ensuire  that the actions of a firm's managers (the
"agents") are consistent with the interests of the firm's owners (the "principals").  When managers do not
act in the interest of owners, "principal-agent problems" arise.  The extent of this conflict depends on a
number of factors, most  importantly the  extent and  quality  of information  about the  activities of the
managers.  Owners have  dealt with the principal-agent problem through a variety of means including:
increasing the  flow  of  information  made  available  by  managers  about  their  activities;  more  intense
monitoring  by  owners  and  others  (including  banks)  of  managers'  conduct  and  performance;  and
8 See Shleifer  and Vishny  (1997).
10implementing mechanismas  to better align the interests of managers and owners/shareholders (for example
performance contracts, stock options and ownership).  Of course, (lifferent types of corporate governance
systems have been used to solve the principal-agent problem.  For example, the United  States and the
United  Kingdonm  rely heavily on  shareholders'  actions in  stock markets, Japan  utilizes  a bank-based
system and Gernnany's framework is centered on institutional investors. 9 There is no obvious ranking as
to  which  of these  three,  or  any  other,  corporate  governance  system  is  best  for  promoting  efficient
corporations.  But  there  is  a  clear  consensus  worldwide  that  all  of  the  most  successful  corporate
governance  systems are  centered  on  the judicious  use  of  market-based  incentives.  The  OECD  has
recently devised a set of corporate governance principles thal provide a useful guideline. 10
'Box  3:  Internal and External Incentives Determine Corporate Performance
There are two categories  of factors  whose dynamic  interplay  determine  the performance  of the modem
corporation:  the "internad"  incentive arrangements  between  o,wners  and managers,  and the "external" factors
that discipline  .md monitor the behavior  of managers and ultimately  the firm's performance.  While internal
incentives  are necessary  to achieve  corporate  efficiency,  they are not sufficient,  external incentives  must also
be manifest.
(a)  Internal Incentives.  These include the structures  and mechanisms  by which the owners cause the
managers  to act for the goals set by the former,  i.e., the internal  "corporate  governance"  anrangements.
This involves  defning how the owners,  the board of directors  and  managers  interact  with one another
to fulfIll  the owners' objectives. The arrangements  stipulate  how various decisions  will be made and
who will be accountable  for them. The principal  decisions  include owners' election  of the board of
directcrs,  the naming  of corporate  officers,  approval/disapproval  of changes to the corporate  charter,
mergers/  acquisitions,  increases  and decreases  in capital, major debt borrowings,  disposal  of assets,
determination  and deployment  of retained earnings  and dividends,  and  the setting  of managerial  pay.
(b)  External Incenatives:  These are factors that are not usually under the direct control of owners
(although  they can have some  indirect  influence  on them). They include  the extent of product  market
competition  (including  the ability for the firm  to affect  market  prices and for new competitors  to enter
and exit the market); the functioning  of equity and debt markets  (including  the effectiveness  of the
"market  for corporate  control"  and of threats  of bankruptcy  or liquidation  for value-subtracting  firms);
the corporation's legal obligations,  including  monitoring  of financial  accounts  through independent
audits; and the competitiveness  of the labor market (including the market for managerial and
entrepreneurial  talent).
Source: Broadm;m (1996).
Associations.  In ]Uzbekistan, as epitomized  in the  case  of the  56  "trade  associations"-which
dominate  key  sectors--corporate  governance  practices  are,  in  general,  not  fully  based  on  market
incentives.  It appears there is often little distinction betweeni  the role of government as policy maker and
regulator, on the one hand, and business shareholder (owner) and manager, on the other.  Formerly sector
ministries, associations were established in 1992-3 by Presidential Decrees, and have  charters approved
by  the Cabinet of M[inisters; typically they are not registered as companies under  the  Company Law.
Although  the  functions  of associations vary  from  sector to  sector,  they  include lobbying to  advance
"members"'  interests; rationalizing output, pricing, investm'int, distribution, input, and foreign exchange
allocation decisions; and operating akin to holding companies.  For three case studies of associations, see
Box 4.  Figure I provides an organizational chart of Uzbekneftegaz, the oil and gas association.
9 See Aoki and  Kim (1995).
'0  OECD  (1999).
11Box 4:  State  'Associations"  in Uzbekistan
There are 56 "trade associations"  in Uzbekistan.  Due to consolidation,  the number  of associations  is decreasing;  last year three
construction  associations  were terminated.  The following  summarizes  case  studies  of 3 associations.
Uzavtotrans  (motor transport  services): Uzavtotrans  was created by Presidential  decree in 1993,  and was formerly  a sector
ministry; although it officially  bears the name of  a "joint stock company", it is not registered under the Company  Law.
Uzavtotrans  is essentially  an administrative  holding  group overseeing  285 firms,  of which about 215 are either state owned  or
joint state-private  and 70 are wholly  private,  including  one joint-venture;  the number  of firms  with private  shareholding  has been
increasing,  virtually  all in the freight  area.  Uzavtotrans  describes  its role as serving  as "an intermediary  between  the Government
and its member-firms".  The firms  in the association  have  approximately  80,000  employees. Uzavtotrans  has a 60% market  share
in passenger  transport,  and a 25% market  share in freight  transport. The  head of Uzavtotrans  has the rank of Minister  and he is a
member of the Cabinet of Ministers.  He is elected by the association's "corporation  council"-its  board of which he is
chairman-and his appointrnent  is approved  by the President  of Uzbekistan.  The corporation  council  has 121  members,  of which
"40 are major shareholders."  Uzavtotrans  does not issue a public  annual  report;  the "minister"  reports regularly  on the sector's
plans and performance  to the Cabinet.  Firms that are members  of Uzavtotrans  officially  pay a membership  fee of 1.5%  of their
reported  profits. The association's  budget for 1998  was  380 million  Som (US$ 2.75 million).  Uzavtotrans  does not directly  get
involved  in foreign  exchange  transactions  with its members. However,  Uzavtotrans  does directly  assist  their firms in arranging
for  bank credits:  in fact it arranges  for State  guarantees  for  the loans  and underwrites  the credit  risk.
Uzbekne egaz (petroleum  and gas): Uzbekneftegaz  is a part  of the former  ministry  for oil and gas,  which dates  back  to the break
up of the USSR. Created  by a 1992  Presidential  decree,  it has gone through several  re-organizations  in the past seven  years;
Uzbekneftegaz  is not registered under the Company  Law.  Its underlying  holdings include 8 directly held entities and 79
indirectly  held entities. All entities  except  for one are reported  to be joint-stock  companies,  with at least 51% state ownership,  as
exercised  through  Uzbekneftegaz  on the underlying  entities'  boards;  the exception  is Uzmal  Oil, which is a joint venture  between
Uzbekistan  and Malaysia. In total, the firms employ 83,000  persons. In the upper level holding  entity itself,  there are 127
employees,  and its budget for 1999  is 700 million Som (US$ 5.1 million);  no information  was available  on the fees collected
from its members.  Uzbekneftegaz  is governed  by (i) a supervisory  committee,  which is chaired by the Prime Minister  and
includes  other ministers,  other state representatives,  including  banks; and (ii) a board of directors,  which is comprised  of nine
senior  managers  of Uzbekneftegaz.  The  board reports  to the supervisory  committee.  The head of Uzbekneftegaz  has the rank of
minister  and is a member  of the Cabinet  of Ministers. Uzbekneftegaz  does not issue a public annual  report;  although  the CEO
does report quarterly  to the Cabinet of Ministers on the association's plans and performance.  Uzbekneftegaz  oversees and
"controls"  the production,  sales and distribution  of the products and services  of its underlying  entities. For domestic  sales  that
Uzbekneftegaz  makes to the Ministry of Energy, prices are regulated by the Ministry of Finance (i.e., the Anti-Monopoly
Committee);  for international  sales, the terms are based on negotiated contracts.  Uzbekneftegaz  manages the earnings  and
disposition  of foreign  exchange  for the underlying  entities. The association  also arranges  and provides guarantees  for credit
extended  by banks  to its underlying  entities;  it  reports  that it has not had a problem  in bank loan defaults.
Uzkhlopko  romsbvt  (cotton  processing  and marketing):  Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  was established  by Presidential  decree in 1992;  it
was the Ministry  of Cotton  Processing. It is not registered  under  the Company  Law. The CEO  has the rank of minister  and is a
member  of the Cabinet of Ministers;  he is appointed by the Cabinet of Ministers. There are about 130 cotton girneries as
members  of Uzkhlopkopromsbyt;  each has 3-4 cotton producers  associated  with them. In total, its member  firms employ  60-
70,000  persons. All of the ginneries  are reported  to be joint-stock  companies.  For the typical  ginnery,  the state owns  51  Woof  the
shares,  employees  own 26%, and individuals  own  the remaining  shares. For the state shares,  Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  represents  the
state on the ginneries'  boards. There is a plan for state ownership  to decrease  to 25%. Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  reports  that at present
it has two main  objectives:  First, it provides  credit  to cotton  producers  from a special  fund established  by a Presidential  decree  to
finance the annual  cotton-picking  campaign;  producers pay back the credits  through selling cotton to Uzkhlopkopromrsbyt  at
predetermined  prices, which may or may not contain a premium compared to world prices.  Second, Uzkhlopkopromsbyt
provides  transport  and storage  services  as well as equipment  and technical  assistance  to ginneries.  Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  does not
engage  in the export  of cotton;  it only has the rights to sell to domestic  factories  (the Ministry of Foreign  Economic  Relations
handles  cotton  exports).  Uzkhlopkopromsbyt  was  unable  to provide  information  on its budget;  the fees it collects  are determined
by the price premia  paid to ginneries,  which it estimates  as 2% of the price, but it varies across  producers. Membership  in the
association  is  not obligatory;  however,  there  are no cotton  producers  that are not in its membership.
Source: Author's  interviews
12Associations are headed by individuals that have the rank of Minister, serve as members of the
Cabinet of Ministers, attend meetings of the Cabinet and regularly report to the Cabinet on the sector's
output, production plans, profitability and other indicator's  of performance.  Some associations have set
up  their own banks;  most  have not.  Associations are  governed by  "boards  of directors"  (or  similar
groups) comprised of sector  'insiders'.  Staff of an association typically  serve on  the boards of their
underlying entities, representing the  State's  interests on the board.s' decisions.  While  most association
members are SO].s, some associations have members that are privatized firms, new private entrants, and
foreign joint  ventures; however, it is widely perceived that most associations are not in favor of their
members being privatized and that they act to forestall such privatizations.  It is also widely perceived that
associations act to undercut competitively the PIFs; for  example by arranging for  subsidized credit or
energy inputs to create an unlevel playing field.  Although in many cases an association may hold less
than a 25% share in an underlying entity-the  size of share ownership required under the Company Law
to block shareholders'  decisions-by  dint of the association's  control over other facets of the sector's
operations, it can exercise control over an entity disproportionately to its ownership.  Managers of the
underlying firms still perceive of the associations as their sector mninistries;  although the name of their
supervisory authority has changed, the firms' managers see no effective change.  While membership in an
association is noit legally mandatory,  in practice, virtually every  fiFrm  operating (or  seeking to operate)
within a given sector is (or becomes) a member of the sector's  association.  Estimates vary as to the size
of membership fees charged, but they appear to be on the order of 10%-20% of profit.
Ccrporate governance incentives and structures appear stronger in the private sector.  In 1999 there
were 84,900 private firms in Uzbekistan; as noted earlier, this accounts for about 45 percent of the total
number of registered firms in the country. Most of these firms are of small and medium size; relative few
are corporations uLnder  the Company Law.  Improvements in corporate governance are most pronounced
in the PIFs.  But  these  entities are not  yet of sufficient  scale  in the economy to  effect  fundamental
behavioral changes in business practices, nor  induce systemic competition economy-wide.  Indeed the
role of the PIFs appears to be on the decline,  in part because of the continued dominance of the trade
associations.
Se,paratinAg  Governmentfrom  Business.  Enhancing corporate governance practices in Uzbekistan
can  como about though  several related  reforms.  First,  in order to  engender real  separation between
government and  business-a  critical  objective for  clarity of corporate  governance  incentives-the  56
"associations"  should  undergo  fundamental  reorganization  and  reform.  This  would  include  (i) their
corporatization and becoming bona fide  commercial  companies--under  the  strictures of the Company
Law.  In other  itransition economies  where  SOEs have  been  corporatized, there  has  been  improved
enterprise perfornance.  At the same time, (ii) the associaticns should employ 'outsiders'  and non-State,
non-government  representatives  on  their  boards  of  directors  and  in  senior  management  positions,
including but  not limited to,  the  chief  executives.  Heads  of associations would  no  longer  serve as
"ministers", sit on the Cabinet of Ministers, nor have membership in the Govermnent.  And, in time, (iii)
the State should divest of its ownership shares in all but a very select few associations, essentially (a)
those where there are bona fide  natural monopoly structures (see below) and (b) bona fide  military or
national security activities.  If the Government is indeed interested in compelling a stronger competitive
environment for private business development in Uzbekistan, continued State ownership on the scale that
currently exists in the associations will be highly problematic.  At a minimum, the Government will need
to come to the realization that if it is interested in enhancing the use-value of State assets, there is a very
strong case for reducing State ownership to a passive, minority position and providing for professional
independent managers to serve as custodians and control association enterprise operations.
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Figure  i:  Organizational  Chart  of UzbekneftegazSimplifying Holding  Company/Group  Structures. Second, simplification,  rationalization and
competitive  restructuring  of holding  group structures  should  also be carried out. In the associations  where
such holding  company-type  structures  exist, they appear (relative  to international  practice)  to be not only
unduly complex and non-transparent-thus making  the task of utilizing internal  control mechanisms  for
effective information galhering/monitoring  of  management and  employee activities difficult-but
arguably  are also not structured  to maximize  economies  of scale and scope,  thus engendering  increased
operational  and production  costs and undermnining  competitiveness. Different associations  will require
different types of simplification,  rationalization  and restructuring,  and there is no uniform model that
should  be implemented.  Carrying  out the two reforms indicated  above  will help reorient  the incentives  to
those who should  be in a better position  than is currently  the case for deciding  what type of restructuring
makes  the best commerciall  sense.
Fostering Competitive Rivalry. Third, by the same token, stronger external competitive
discipline on the associations will also help compel the restructuring that is desirable.  In part,
this means following through with the other reforms suggested in the sections above for
improving the overall competitive environment in Uzbekistan.  This should help encourage new
private business entry and provide for a more fertile environment for PIFs to challenge the
market domain of the associations.  The example set by China of allowing non-state firms to
challenge SOEs is instructive in this regard."  But it also means that other external checks and
balances need to be put in place.  In particular, commercial and risk-based banking and financial
sector practices are required to exert effective credit and cLebt  collection discipline on business
performance.  Similarly, application of international accountingr  standards (IAS) and published
regular atudits  of such financial accounts carried out by independent auditors will also be
essential.
VII. COMPETITIVE  RESTRUCTURING  AND REFORM OF INRASTRUCTURE
MONOPOLIES
Like other  transition  economies,  Uzbekistan  has adopted  the nomenclature  of "natural  monopolies"
for  specific sectors of  the  economy-those  that  typically encompass large  firms that  provide
infrastructure  services  on Et  public, economy-wide  basis, i.e., services  that are either basic inputs to other
businesses  or basic provisions  for the livelihood  of households. Rooted in the earlier Soviet  regime, the
designations  of mEay such monopolies  as "natural" have less to do with the true economic  structure  of
markets than with previous notions of command and control and central planning, as enshrined in
statutory  criteria.
Under Uzbekistan law-for  example, the law "On Competition and Restriction of Monopoly
Activity in  Commnodity  Markets"-at  least the following sectors are formally defined as "natural
monopolies":  (i) production  of oil, gas condensate  and natural gas; (ii) coal mining;  (iii) pipeline  transport
of oil, refined  petroleum  and natural gas; (iv) generation,  transmission  and distribution  of electric power
and heat; I(v)  railway transport; (vi) port services; (vii) airport services; (viii) telecommunications;  (ix)
postal services;  and (x) water supply and sewage. Table 2 indicates  the number of "natural nmbnopoly"
suppliers  in each sector  as indicated  by the Anti-Monopoly  Committee  as of October  1999.
See Broadinan (1999).
15Table 2: Uzbekistan Enterprises Registered as "Natural Monopolies" at the Republic Level
(as of October 1, 1999)
Sectors  with "Natural  Monopolies"  Number  of Enterprises
Production  of oil, gas condensate  and natural  gas  7
Coal  mining  4
Pipeline  transport  of oil
Pipeline  transport  of natural  gas  2
Generation,  transmission  and distribution  of electric  power  and heat  48
Railway  transport  I
Airport  services  12
Postal services  16
Teleconimmunications  21
Water  and sewage  30
Total  142
Source: Uzbekistan Anti-Monopoly Committee
When  Monopolies  are  No  Longer  "Nat ural'.  International  experience  shows  that  policies  that
stifle  the  operation  of  inherently  competitive  infrastructure  sectors,  as  well  as  prevent  the  progression  of
traditional  "natural"  monopolies  into  more  competitive  regimes,  impose  costs  on  society  in  the  form  of
high  consumer  prices,  poor  production  efficiency  and  retarded  innovation.  Distinguishing  between
competitive  versus  noncompetitive  infrastructure  sectors  is  thus  an  important  policy  issue  in  designing
further  transition  reform  initiatives.  In  this  regard,  governments  worldwide  typically  categorize  public
enterprises  into  three  groups,  and  this  taxonomy  provides  a useful  guide  for  Uzbekistan  policymakers:  (a)
in  "strategic"  industries-the  national  military  defense  sector,  the  currency  mint,  and  the  mining  of  rare
metals  that  have  national  defense  applications-there  is,  with  few  exceptions,  a  compelling  rationale  for
state  involvement;  (b)  in  "monopoly  or  quasi-monopoly"  industries-usually  local-level  utilities  in  the
energy,  mass  transit  and  communication  sectors-the  rationale  for  government  involvement,  either
through  direct  ownership  or  regulatory  oversight  of  nonstate-owned  service  providers,  has  historically
been  strong  inasmuch  as  market  forces  alone  can  often  produce  suboptimal  results;  however,  such  sectors
can  evolve  to  a point  where  the  competitive  provision  of  such  services  is most  efficient,  and  this  outcome
has  often  entailed  the  divestiture  of  utility  firms  to  private  6ovners;  and  (c)  in  "commercial"  industries-
most  of  the  manufacturing  and  services  sectors-there  is  generally  little  justification  for  state
involvement,  as  competitive  market  forces  often  engender  the  greatest  efficiencies.
The  overwhelming  majority  of  industrial  sectors  in  countries  around  the  world  today  possess
underlying  organizational  structures  that  are  inherently  competitive.  Thus  within  the  typical  indlulstrial
sector,  maximum  social  efficiency  is  realized  when  numerous  firms  are  producing  the  product  (or
service);  the  output  share  of  each  firm  is  not  large  enough  to  control  the  prevailing  price  in the  market;
any  attempt  by  a firm  to  charge  an  above-market  price  will  produce  a loss  of  consumers  or  entry  by  rival
16firms eroding any temporary excess profits; and prolonged losses of poorly performing firms will bring
on a change of managerment,  a buy-out by new owners, exit or liquidation of the firm.  In such "naturally"
competitive sectors, artific:ially  restricting the number of firms or output through government intervention,
such as by establishing policy barriers to entry or exit, burdensome registration or licensing requirements,
or international tariffs and quotas, raises consumer prices, reduces productive efficiency of the firms, and
stifles innovation.  Socilety  is thus made worse off.
In contrast, there are a limited number of other sectors where  society benefits from fewer firms.
These "natural" monopoly (or oligopoly)  sectors have a special characteristic unique to the product (or
service)  they  are  producing,  often  due  to  industry-specific technologies:  as production  expands,  the
average cost of producing each additional unit declines.  In such special situations, it is most efficient to
let one or a few firms produce as much as the market demands; indeed too many firms all trying to take
advantage of the sector's inherent economies of scale will result uneconomic duplication of facilities and
chronic losses. This raises the question: doesn't  allowing only one or a few firms to operate in a market
simply invite them to take advantage of the opportunity to set prices too high?  There are two answers.  In
some cases, the best solution is to give the firms exclusive market franchises in return for subjecting their
price-setting or profits to regulation.  In other cases, the cost of entry and exit by rival firms is relatively
low.  As a result, the credible threat posed by potential competitors exerts a sufficiently strong discipline
on the incumbent firm (or firms) to keep prices at competitive levels; these are sometimes referred to as
"contestable" markets.
Worldwide, the inherently competitive sectors generally encompass all of manufacturing and many
natural  resource  and  services  industries;  this  includes,  for  example,  chemicals;  steel;  machinery;
automobile production;  textiles; electronics;  oil, gas and  coal; and. construction.  Some utility  service
industries  possess  organizational  structures  that  are  naturally  monopolistic  (or  oligopolistic).
Underground pipeline  distribution of natural  gas  at the city  level to residential  consumers  is a  good
example; imiversally, such firms are given market franchises ,md subjected to regulation.  But economic
history teaches that many industries thought to be natural monopolies actually go through life cycles; as
they mature, technology advances and markets grow, they evolve into competitive sectors.  Whereas long
distance telecommnunications  or postal services previously were considered "natural"  monopolies, today
they are inherently competitively structured.  The airline industry has  also evolved  into a  contestable
sector.  Putting in place government policies that either prevent such an evolution or maintain artificial
monopolies can inflict sizable costs  on  society in terms of  increased prices;  lost output; poor service
quality; and reduced innovation.
Competitive  Unbundling  and Restructuring.  These  lessons  suggest  several  reform  items  for
Uzbekistan.  The first is the need for proactive restructuring and unbundling in state owned infrastructure
market  segments  where  (i)  monopoly  structures  are  not,  or  are  no  longer,  "natural"  and  (ii)  the
(deregulated) private, competitive provision of utility services withl open entry will enhance economic
welfare.  Sectors where such reforms are most needed likely include coal mining,  oil and natural  gas
production, telecommunications, electric generation and transmission, railways and other forms of long-
haul transport, airlport senrices, and postal services.  The draft Program of Formation of a Competitive
Environmentfor  2000-2005 recently tabled with the Cabinet of Ministers too modestly begins to address
some of these objectives.  The sectoral spread covered in the Program is far too narrow.  Moreover, the
Program foresees maintenance of price  controls on such sectors, where  not only  should there be entry
deregulation but also price deregulation.
Privatization  and  Competitive  Entry.  Second,  there  should  be  plans  developed  for  the
privatization of these  entities, utilizing  international best practice  itransparent and competitive case-by-
case privatization techniques with the assistance of independent financial advisors.  The objective should
be to attract new private  strategic investors to  enhance the operational  efficiency  of the  entities sold.
17However, privatization of these infrastructure monopolies should not  precede the establishment of
effective  competition  policy and regulatory  disciplines  so as to prevent  simply  shifting  a public  monopoly
to a private monopoly.
Regulatory  Reform. Third, in the remaining  infrastructure  monopoly  market segments,  reforms  of
regulatory institutions  and oversight  procedures are needed to bring Uzbekistan's regulatory regime in
line with international  practice. Indeed this is also an objective on the agenda of the Anti-Monopoly
Committee. Specifically  actions  are needed in this regard  along  several  fronts:
*  De-politicization  of tariff-setting,  entry/exit  decisions,  service  offerings  and implementation  of
other regulatory  mechanisms. In part, this will come about  through the restructuring  of the Anti-
Monopoly Committee into as  independent agency as suggested above.  Use of  independent
regulators  and judges (where  necessary)  is critical to ensuring  impartiality  of regulatory  decisions.
The term/tenure  of regulatory  officials  should  be made immune  from the political process/cycle.
*  Reduction  of discretionary  behavior in implementing  regulations. Achieving  this objective  will
necessitate strengthening the  legislation that  defines the- rules-based regime and  enforcing
incentives/disincentives  for officials to adopt stricter adherence  to that regime.  Streamlining  the
decision-making  process  will also reduce  opportunities  for discretionary  conduct  by regulators.
*  The content of the regulations should ensure that price, output and investment  decisions  by
service suppliers are both in line with costs and pro-competitive,  i.e., that they create a  "level
playing field" among users so as to  not provide for  cross-subsidies  and unfair advantages,
especially  between  SOEs and private firms.
*  Safeguards  should be put in place that increase  the public transparency  and accountability  of
regulatory  decisions. This can be accomplished  through regular  public hearings  where all affected
interests  can participate,  including  the regulated  entities,  their business  and residential consumers,
workers  and the general public.  There should also be a transparent appeals  process  for businesses
and consumers  who wish to question  decisions  that have been  undertaken.
VIII.  CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The preceding  analysis  suggested  several  areas  where Uzbekistan  should  focus its structural  reform
agenda in order  to enhance  the country's enabling environment  for business  development  and growth. It
is clear  that a better understanding  of, and appreciation  for the benefits  of enterprise  competition  and(  how
it influences  economic  growth are needed  among senior policy makers,  businesses  (including  banks and
the privatization  investment  funds (PIFs)),  and consumers. This can be fostered  through  better training of
officials on the concepts of competition  and regulation; use of on-the-ground  policy advisors that can
bring to bear international experience in implementing  competition and regulatory reforrn policies,
including improving  the legislative  framework;  and greater public education  through, for example, the
creation of non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs) to communicate  the benefits of competitioni  and
possibly  serve  as an ombudsman  for consumer  rights.
Reform  of Uzbekistan's  competition  policy framework  should be devised  and implemented  within
the broader  context of the Government's  goal of strengthening  the overall structural reform program;  it
should also be linked with the country's macroeconomic  policy objectives. Formulation  of policies to
enhance the business environment should focus not only on  fostering the competitive conduct of
incumbent  firms, but also on (i) reducing  barriers  to entry by new firms-usually  the engines of growth
18and employment  creation in transition  economies  and (ii) reducing fiscal and financial system business
subsidies-"hardening  budget  constraints"-and  facilitating the  restructuring, reorganization and
bankruptcy,  including where necessary liquidation,  of inefficient firms so as to re-channel  bottled up
assets to new ventures. At the same  time, the industrial  policy regime should be reformed  to be made
consistent  with the objectives  of the country's competition policy.  Similarly,  reforms in the areas of
foreign exchange liberalization,  international  trade and direct investment,  fiscal and financial sector
policy should  be informed  by, and harmonized  with those aimed at improving  the competitive  business
environment.
The analytical  capabilities  of Governmental  and associated  institutions  also need  to be considerably
enhanced to  carry out on  a  systematic and regular basis and in  line with  international practice,
independent  economic;  assessments of Uzbekistan's industrial market structure and determinants of
enterprise  conduct  and performance.  To date, only a handful  of major  analyses  of Uzbekistan's  industrial
structure  has been undertaken;  and most have been on a sectoral basis.  Moreover  they have generally
focused  on the narrow  issues  of competition  as defined  by current statutes,  such as legally  defined  market
shares. Rather, what is needed to inform effectively  Government  competition  policy-making  consistent
with promoting the publ:ic  interest are: (i) comprehensive  independent  assessments of product and
geographic  market boundaries, as determined by economic forces so as to accurately gauge market
structures;  (ii) analysis  of how the structure  of markets  (e.g., extent of producer  concentration  and barrier
to entry)  influences  business  performance  and economic  welfare; and a focus on not only specific sectors
but also on cross-sectoral  market  structures,  such as horizontal  and vertical  integration.
In order to create  a credible  competition  "champion"-one with teeth-within  the Government,  the
organization,  structure  and functions  of the existing authority  responsible  for competition  and regulatory
policy-making  ancl  enforcement  should  be transformed  into an independent  agency, reporting  directly  to
the Prime  Minister. The current  Anti-Monopoly  Committee  is an outgrowth  from the earlier Committee
on Prices (hence its rcliance on price controls  as a competition  policy instrument),  and is part of the
Ministry  of Finance,  with a Deputy Finance Minister  serving as its Chairman. To effect greater public
commitment  to implerment  competition  policy in a de-politicized  ifashion,  reduce apparent conflicts of
interest, and have the clout to deal with powerful vested interests,  both on an inter-agency  basis and
within  the economy  at the republic  and local levels,  there is a need to break  from the past and reinvigorate
the agency  with a new mandate  and "corporate  culture". There is a not a single  model for restructuring  of
the agency,  but int:ernational  practice suggests  a set of principles  upon which the agency should operate,
including,  but not limited to: decisions  should be rules-basecl;  the entity's budget should be financially
autonomous  from other ministries;  there should be a transparent appeals process for consumers and
businesses,  including public hearings;  the agency should  have autonomous  legislative  authority;  and the
agency's performance  should be subject to regular public monitoring to ensure the public interest is
protected.
Corporate  governance  incentives  and institutions  should be strengthened  and brought in line with
market-based  principles and international  practice (for example,  the new OECD corporate govemnance
guidelines)  to engender  greater transparency  and accountability. Currently,  sound corporate  governance
practices  are blunted  because of ill-defined  organizational  structures  and institutions,  contradictory  lines
of authority,  and weak disciplines/checks  and balances,  especially  in the management  of State  a3sets. As
epitomized  in the case of the 56 "trade associations",  it appears  there is often little distinction  between  the
role of government  as policy  maker and regulator,  on the one hand, and business  shareholder  (owner)  and
manager,  on the olher: as former sector  ministries,  these holding  group entities  bear little resemblance  to
bona fide companies, are still headed by individuals that serve on the Cabinet of Ministers, and are
governed  by boards of directors  comprised  of 'insiders'.  Corporate  governance  incentives  and structures
appear  stronger  in the  nascent  private sector,  especially  the PIU's,  but these entities  are not yet of sufficient
competitive  scale in the economy  to effect fundamental  behavioral  changes; indeed the role of the PIFs
19appears  to  be  on  the  decline,  despite  the  growing  private  sector.  Generally,  enhanced  corporate
governance  could  be  brought  about  through  (i)  corporatization  (under  the  company  law),
privatization/divestiture  and  competitive  restructuring  of  "associations"  in  order  to  engender  real
separation of government from business; (ii) use of outsiders and non-state representatives on boards of
directors and senior management; (iii) commercial and risk-based banking and financial sector practices
that  exert  effective  credit  discipline  on  business  performance;  and  (iv)  application  of  international
accounting  standards  and  published  regular  audits  of financial  accounts  carried  out  by  independent
auditors.
Finally, infrastructure monopolies should be subject to  systemic restructuring and unbundling in
market segments where  monopoly structures are not, or are no  longer,  "natural"  and the (deregulated)
private, competitive provision  of utility services with open entry  enhances economic  welfare.  In the
remaining  infrastructure  monopoly  market  segments, reform  of  regulatory  institutions  and  oversight
procedures is needed to de-politicize tariff setting and implementation of other regulatory mechanisms;
ensure that price, output and investment decisions by service suppliers are pro-competitive (i.e., create a
"level playing field" among users); and increase public transparency and accountability.  The plethora of
so-called "natural monopolies" in Uzbekistan stems less from application of economic criteria than of old
style  statutory designations; with the  development and  expansion  of markets,  as well  as advances in
technologies, increasing types  of utility  services, such as telecommunications  and  electric generation
(among  others),  when  provided  through  competitive  multiple  suppliers,  rather  than  protected  single
suppliers, offer the best chances for cost-based prices, high service quality and reliability, and innovation.
In most utility segments, then, the bias should shift towards regulation by  market forces rather than by
administrative  means;  however,  privatization  of  infrastructure  monopolies  should  not  precede
establishment of effective competition policy and regulatory disciplines so as to prevent simply shifting a
public  monopoly  to  a  private  monopoly.  Reform  of  regulatory  mechanisms  should  be  keyed  to
strengthening and streamlining the rules-based framework; enhancing safeguards to ensure that decisions
regarding rate-making and service offerings are impartial and independent;  providing for the tenure of
regulatory officials to be immune from the political process; establishing a transparent appeals process for
consumers and businesses, including public hearings.
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